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The determinants and motives of Arab-aid have been a very controversial and 
debatable topic in the literature of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. This thesis 
does not intend to study the Arab-aid in a broad perspective, but to examine what 
determines Arab-aid giving and what factors motivate the Arab-aid donors in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The thesis also study the socio-cultural impacts of this aid and 
humanitarian assistance on the lives of the local citizens. The main determinants 
mentioned in the study are; Islamic Unity, Afro-Arab Solidarity, Same Voting Pattern 
in the United Nations’ meetings, and Diplomatic Relationship with Israel. It is stated in 
the study that one of the ways Arab-aid donors render humanitarian services is by 
building mosques and giving out scholarship to SSA students to study abroad. These 
students later return to their country of origin to preach and lead various mosques. The 
local population often behaves and acts according to the teachings of these scholars. 
With regards to the fact that most SSA predominantly Muslim countries belong to the 
Sunni-Maliki and Sufism brotherhood, this preaching has led to sectarian division, 
radicalization and the end result of this is conflict and terrorism. This radicalization 
coupled with poverty, unemployment, lack of security, mismanagement of public 
funds, and illiteracy will automatically open door to terrorism. The main theoretical 
framework used in this study is social constructivism and both primary and secondary 
data sources were used to analyze the arguments. The Arab oil producing countries 
that are mentioned are Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The countries in the case 
studies are Guinea, Mali and Senegal respectively. The end result proved one of our 
motives of Arab-aid donors, which is; to reduce the influence of Iran in SSA. Some 
case studies showed that several religious conflicts have happened since this aid giving 
policy started. The end result also shows that a significant amount of youths are willing 
to join terrorist and radicalized groups if an analytical approach is not taken to tackle 
the problem. 
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Dış ve insani yardım literatiründe Arap yardımının belirleyici faktörleri ve sebepleri çok 
tartışmalı bir konu olmuştur. Bu tez, Arap yardımını geniş bir perspektifte incelemeyi 
amaçlamamaktadır. Fakat Sahra-Altı Afrika’da neyin Arap yardımına neden olduğunu ve 
hangi faktörlerin Arap yardımı bağışçılarını harekete geçirdiğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 
Bu tez ayrıca bu destek ve insani yardımların yerel vatandaşların yaşamları üzerindeki sosyo-
kültürel etkilerini de incelemektedir. Araştırmada belirtilen ana etkenler; İslam Birliği, Afro-
Arap Dayanışması, Birleşmiş Milletler Toplantılarında Eşit Oylama Sistemi, İsrail ile 
Diplomatik İlişkiler vb. Araştırmada, Arap yardım kuruluşlarının insani hizmet verme 
yollarından birinin camiler inşa ederek ve SSA öğrecilerine yurtdışında okumaları için burs 
dağıtarak gerçekleştirildiği belirtilmektedir. Bu öğrenciler daha sonra vaaz vermek ve çeşitli 
camileri yönetmek için kendi ülkelerine dönerler. Yerel nüfus genel olarak bu bursiyerlerin 
öğretilerine göre davranır ve hareket eder. Ezici çoğunluğa sahip sünni-maliki ve sufizm 
kardeşliğine dayanan müslüman SSA ülkeleri gerçeği bakımından, bu vaazların verilmesi 
mezhepsel bölünmeye, radikalleşmeye ve bunun sonucu olarak çatışmaya ve terörizme sebep 
olmuştur. Bu radikalleşme, yoksulluk, işsizlik, güvenlik eksikliği, kamu fonlarının yanlış 
yönetilmesi ve okuryazarlık oranının düşüklüğüyle birleştiğinde terörizme otomatik olarak 
kapı açacaktır. Bu araştırmada kullanılan ana kuramsal çerçeve sosyal yapısalcılıktır ve 
argümanları analiz etmek için hem birincil hem de ikincil veri kaynakları kullanılmıştır. Konu 
edinilen petrol üreticisi Arap ülkeleri; Abu Dabi, Kuveyt ve Suudi Arabistan’dır. Örnek olay 
çalışmalarındaki ülkeler sırasıyla Gine, Mali ve Senegal’dir. Sonuç olarak Arap yardımı 
bağışçılarının yardım sebeplerinden birinin SSA’da İran etkisini kırmak olduğunu ortaya 
koydu. Bazı örnek olay çalışmaları gösterdi ki bu yardım politikası başladığından bu yana 
çeşitli bölgesel çatışmalar meydana geldi. Ayrıca sonuçlar, sorunun üstesinden gelmek için 
analitik bir yaklaşımın alınmaması durumunda önemli miktarda gencin terörist ve 











Background and Scope of the Research  
The principal determinants and motives of Arab aid in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have 
been a debatable topic in the international relations literature. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates are the three principal countries that have been among the largest 
provider of Arab-aid since after the oil boom of the 1970s, about a total Official 
Development Assistance (ODA)1 of 272 billion dollars have been allocated to low 
income countries.2 In addition to bilateral aid between government to government, Arab 
donors have set up multilateral financial organizations to provide loans and grants to 
low income countries of SSA countries.  
Some academicians such as Eric Neumayer (2003) argues that some of the factors that 
make a country suitable for the obtainment of the Arab aid includes Arab solidarity, 
Afro-Arab relationship for the case of Africa, same voting pattern with the Arab donors 
in the United Nations meetings, and not having diplomatic relations with Israel.3 The 
diplomatic competition between the Arab States and Israel has escalated dramatically in 
SSA countries immediately after decolonization. A change in policies of SSA countries 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict was principally inspired by the expectation of receiving 
foreign aid from the Arab States in the light of their newly found petroleum wealth due 
to the increase in price of petroleum resources.4 This was successful immediately after 
                                                          
1 The Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a calculation that mainly focuses on the consensus of the 
DAC members. Its real description was a compromise for some DAC members, it was not sufficiently 
concenssional, but for the others it did not include support that played an important position in their 
aid-giving programs. For some years, the DAC and its working parties have discussed marginal revisions 
and refinements. Hynes W. and Scott S, ‘’The Evolution of Official Development Assistance: 
Achievements, Criticisms and a Way Forward,’’ OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, OECD 
Publishing, no. 12 (2013). http://dx.doi.org/10.178715k3v1dv3fo24-en.  
2 The World Bank, Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Co-operation: Document of World 
Bank, (Washington, DC 20433, 2010), 1. 
http://siteresources.worlbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/ADAPub82410web.pdf.  
3 Eric Neumayer, ‘’What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral 
Agencies,’’ The Journal of Development Studies, no. 39(4) (2003): 134-47. 
4 Abdul Aziz Jalloh, ‘’The Policies of Black African States towards the Arab World,’’ in The General History 




the 6 days war of 1967,5 the honeymoon period between Israel and SSA came to an 
end,6 and also in 1973, 25 SSA countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel.7 
It is also conceived that a substantial amount of the Arab funds appropriated to 
charitable and humanitarian activities has been channeled to radical and terrorist groups. 
This is true for Al-Qaeda, Jemmah Islamiyah, and the Haqqani network in the Asian 
countries.8 This is also applicable to terrorist and radical groups in SSA countries.  
Arab aid also started flowing in SSA countries immediately after the Iranian revolution 
of 1979,9 two factors can possibly explain this, one is Saudi Arabia wants to have soft 
power over Iran in the Muslim world, especially in the region of SSA. And the second is 
Saudi Arabia with limited strategic goals want to counter the influence of Iran in SSA.10 
After the Iranian revolution, the country was dedicated to the two main goals of the 
Khomeini regime, which include the institutionalization of the revolution in Iran and its 
spread to other parts of the Muslim world.11 The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that it 
can make the world safe by the export of its revolution.12  
                                                          
5 The possible explanation that were given to Sub-Saharan Africa diplomatic relations with Israel in the 
early 1970s ranged from Muslim factor, Africa’ political opportunism, Arabs’ successful use of 
advantages of geography, religious, ideological, and propaganda factors, and Arab oil as a weapon of 
political and economic persuasions. Maudely Johnson, ‘’ A Diplomatic Battleground in the Arab/Israeli 
Conflict, 1967-1973,’’ Ufahumu: A Journal of African Studies, (1992): 32-50.  
6 Naomi Chazan, ‘’ Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era,’’ The African Institute of the American 
Jewish Committee, (2006): 3. 
7 Zach Levey, ‘’Israel’s Exist from Africa, 1973: The Road to Diplomatic Isolation,’’ British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies, no. 35(2) (2008): 206. DOI: 10.1080/13530190802180621. Philipp O. Amour, 
“Palestinian Politics in Transition: The Case of the October War,’’ in The October 1973 War: Politics, 
Diplomacy, Legacy, ed. Asaf Siniver (London: Hurst and Company, 2013), 137–54. 
8 Abuzza Z, Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah 
Islamiyah, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Studies, 2013), 12-21 
9 In 1979, many African Muslims including the Muslims of SSA viewed the Iranian Revolution as a victory 
of popular forces against a corrupt and repressive supported by the Western States. For instance in 
Nigeria, the Iranian delegations and embassy personnel started recruiting and introducing their 
propaganda at the universities. Also in Senegal, Tehran provided financial support to an active group of 
followers. Iran in 1984 had 18 embassies in Africa compared to half of that number before the 
revolution. Some African governments also welcomed Iran’s offers of concessionary oil prices and 
financial assistance. Cenral Intelligence Agency, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: Growing Iranian Activity, Central 
Intelligence Agency, (1984). 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP85S00317R000300110005-1.pdf  access on 
01/04/2018 
10 Gerald Feierstein and Craig Greathead. ‘’The Fight For Africa: The New Focus of The Saudi-Iranian 
Rivalry.’’ Policy Focus, no. 2 (2007): 8. 
11 As John L. Esposito observes in ‘’The Iranian Revolution: A Ten-Year Perspective,’’ Iranian history and 
institutions have been interwined with Shiism since Islam was established as the state religion in the 




The impact of the Iranian revolution could be seen in Nigeria which is the most 
populated13 SSA country with about a population of 177 million people. The Iranian 
revolution inspired and motivated many Nigerian Muslim leaders; they welcomed many 
of the subjects in the ideology such as the condemnation of corruption, westernization, 
and implementation of Sharia (Islamic Law).14 An example of a school dedicated to the 
teaching and spreading of the ideology of Shiism is Hujjatiyeh Seminary located in 
Qum, Iran. This school was turned into an international religious one immediately after 
the revolution by Ayatollah Montazani. Students from all over the world, particularly 
from Africa came to learn there and the main objective of the institution is to export the 
revolution through educational training.15  
The growing and rapid spread of Shiism was one of the factors that motivated the Arab 
states, most especially Saudi Arabia to counterattack the Iranian policies by sponsoring 
religious schools in the region of SSA and by also distributing scholarship to hundreds 
of students.16 Morocco in the northern part of Africa is a blatant example of this; 
according to Professor Mohamed Darif17 in an interview in 2003, Moroccans authorities 
were confronted with the rise of Political Islam after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and 
the Wahhabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia was crucial in preventing the proliferation of 
Shiism in Morocco according to Darif. Saudi Arabia was able to finance religious 
schools and give out scholarships to many students mainly due to the oil boom of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
an integral part of state and society. John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, The Iranian Revolution: It’s 
Global Impact, ed. By John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 3. 
12 R.K Ramazani, ‘’Iran’s Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means, ‘’in The Iranian Revolution: 
Its Global Impact, ed. By John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 41. 
13 Nigeria is the most populous country in the whole Africa, due to its large population, it also has the 
highest percentage of Muslims living in SSA. 
14 Ibrahim A. Gambari, ‘’Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria: Homegrown or Externally Induced?’’ in The Iranian 
Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. by John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 302-16. 
15 Farhang Rajaee, ‘’Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution,’’ in The Iranian 
Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. by John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 75. 
16 AFET is after the French name ‘’Affaires étrangères’’,  that was previously called Political Affairs, is a 
committee of the European Parliament. Composed of 75 members and 74 substitutes, it has two 
subcommittees: the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) and the Subcommittee on Security and 
Defence (SEDE). AFET, The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to 
Rebel Groups Around the World. European Parliament. Directorate-General for External Policies, 
(Brussels, European Union, 2013), 19. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-
AFET_ET(2013)457137_EN.pdf   
17 Mohamed Darif is a professor and a specialist on Islam living Morocco. He described the roles of Saudi 




1970s and these Wahhabi trained preachers returned to their home countries to 
disseminate their ideologies.18 
These arguments above pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly state some of 
our arguments for the motives of Arab aid. These motives include acquisition of soft 
power, sectarian goals and hindrance of the influence of Iran and Shiism in SSA 
countries. This issue will be addressed in details in the later part of the thesis and some 
data will also be provided to see how Arab aid allocated to SSA countries increased 
after the Iranian revolution. 
Problem Statement 
Aid in general has been detrimental to the economy and political structure of SSA 
countries.19 Arab aid givers are not much interested in political goals like the West who 
favor more democratized countries before giving out loans and grants. Though some 
authors such as Espen has argued that Arab donors pursue commercial interest and 
foreign policy goals in giving out aid, but they are less concerned with economic and 
political policies of the receiving country.20 
This thesis does not intend to speak much about the political and economic 
consequences of Arab aid to SSA countries, but the socio-cultural factors it plays in the 
governmental policies and individual lives. One of the goals of Saudi Arabia is to 
promote its Wahhabi doctrine21 in the Muslim world, in the process of doing this; they 
have provided grants and loans to low income countries of SSA. Some of these grants 
                                                          
18 AFET, The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups 
Around the World, 18-19. 
19 Mohammed Hashiru and Mohamed Camara. ‘’Is Foreign Financial Aid Conducive to Helping African 
Countries?’’ Bildiriler Kitabı: 4th International Student Congress: Manisa Celal Bayar University, (2017): 
415 
20 Espen Villanger, ‘’Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives,’’ Forums For 
Development Studies, no. 34(2) (2007): 238-40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2007.9666378 
21 Wahhabism is an Islamic doctrine that was founded by Mohammed Ibn Abdal-Wahhab (1703-94). The 
word has been termed as both ultraconservative (Mark and Wade 2011: 1369) and fundamentalist 
(Schwartz 2014). Mohammed Ibn Abdal-Wahhab ideas were profoundly influenced by the doctrines of 
Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328), who qualified the state as a complement of Religion and diametrically 
opposed disgressive theology. The ideas of Wahhabism were more propounded in the 20th century by 
Sayyid Qutb. 
 In 1974, a pact was made by the Wahhabi founder and the house of Saud. David Commins, The 




are given as charities to build madrassas (Islamic/Quranic school)22. Most of these 
schools have acted as centers of indoctrination of young Muslim population who live in 
severe poverty. This argument is supported by the US State Department which argues 
that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has invested so far more than 10 billion23 US Dollars 
in charitable and humanitarian organizations that distribute its Wahhabi doctrine.24 One 
of the arguments in the model I provided in this thesis shows that due to lack of access 
to knowledge and information, these local citizens of SSA have been persuaded and 
convinced to accept these ideologies as part of their ways of life without having prior 
knowledge of what they are practicing.  
Also in my model given below, another way Saudi Arabia has succeeded in the 
proliferation of its ideology is through the training of preachers from these regions who 
use the local mosques25 in their communities to disseminate the Wahhabi doctrine. This 
statement is supported by Yousuf Butt (2018)26 who wrote in The World Post that the 
money provided by KSA is directed to the construction and operation of madrassas and 
mosques that disperse a radical form of Wahhabism. The model in this thesis claim that 
these Wahhabi trained preachers have contributed tremendously to the indoctrination of 
local citizens and this has automatically led to the radicalization of these youths. This 
radicalization coupled with poverty, lack of adequate education, illiteracy, corruption 
etc. has also contributed to terrorist recruitments in SSA.  
                                                          
22 David McCormack, ‘’An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa,’’ The Center for Security 
Policy, no. 4 (2005): 5 
23See What is Wahhabism? ‘’The Reactionary Branch of Islam said to be ‘the main source of global 
terrorism’,” The Telegraph, May 19, 2017. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/what-is-
wahhabism-the-reactionary-branch-of-islam-said-to-be-the/   
24 CJPME, Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism, Canadians for Justice and Peace in Middle East. (2011), 
2.https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cjpme/pages/2255/attachments/original/1472227881/201-
En-Saudi_Arabia_and_Wahhabism_v5.pdf?1472227881 
25 In 2004, an article by Washington Post Reporter quoted a former US Treasury Department Official 
saying an estimated amount of 75 billion had been spent by the late King of Saudi Arabia to spread 
Wahhabism worldwide. According to the same reporter, the late King, on his official website bragged 
about financing and founding 1500 mosques, 210 Islamic centers, 200 Islamic colleges, and 2000 schools 
for Muslim chidren in countries that are not predominantly Muslims. By 2000, 138 million copies of the 
Koran had been distributed by the late King through a publishing center founded by himself in Medina. 
David Ottaway, The King’s Messenger, (New York: Walker 2008), 185. Karren Elliot, ‘’On Saudi Arabia: Its 
People, Past Religion, Fault Lines and Future,’’ Knopf (2012): 234. 
26 Yousuf Butt is a visiting Senior Research member at the National Defence University, he researches at 
the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. His writing was accessed on 31/03/2018, on The 
World Post of Berggruen Institute which main objective is to shape economic, political and social 




Mali, Senegal, and Guinea are all predominantly Muslim countries and they are the only 
country in SSA to have all obtained more than 1%27 each of the total Arab loans and 
finance since its commencement in the 1970s. What determines these three countries to 
be among the largest receiver of Arab aid can be attributed to several factors such as 
Islamic solidarity and Afro-Arab relationship. But, several other factors deter this, such 
as young Muslim population and low level per capita income28. 
My thesis proposes that the high risk of indoctrination and radicalization will reduce 
drastically if Arab aid is allocated properly. It is very important to address this issue, 
because taking an analytical approach to solve this problem will lead to effective use of 
the Arab aid in SSA countries. It is also indispensable that aid should be allocated 
effectively in order to reduce the rate of corruption and mismanagement of funds in 
SSA. 
Objectives and Research Question 
The main objectives of this study are to examine the principal determinants and motives 
of Arab aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis also intends to ascertain whether Arab aid 
has impacted the socio-cultural behaviors and policies of the people of SSA countries. 
As mentioned before this thesis does not aim to determine the economic influence and 
objectives of Arab aid donors. It aims to look at the motives of the aid donors and the 
final influence these motives have on the local population of this region, since one of 
the final beneficiaries of this aid is the local population. From the aforementioned 
objectives, this thesis seeks to answer two principal questions:  
1. What are the main factors and motives i.e. determinants of Arab aid flow to Sub-
Saharan Africa?29 
2. How have the activities of this aid giving influenced the lives of the local 
population in this region? 
                                                          
27  According to Espen Villanger, Senegal has received 1.6% of the total Arab finance which accounts for 
1.2 billion US Dollars while both Mali and Guinea have both received 800 million US Dollars (1.1% each). 
Espen, ‘’Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives,’’ 237. 
28 Neumayer (2003) made some statistical analyses using the two independent stages ‘’the level stage 
and the gate keeping stage’’. The end result shows young population and low level per capita income 
determines the allocation of Arab aid in the level stage. Eric Neumayer, ‘’What Factors Determine the 
Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral Agencies?’’ 140-44. 




Contribution to Literature 
The major contribution of this study to literature is that it will examine the determinants 
and motives of Arab humanitarian aid and assistance to SSA countries30. Another 
contribution is; it will also study the socio-cultural influences of this aid on the daily 
lives of the local citizens of this region.31 
As stated earlier in the introductory part of this thesis, some charitable activities has led 
to the building of Islamic schools and giving out of scholarships to young academicians 
and scholars in the field of theology- who later come back to their various countries of 
origin to preach- this has led to the indoctrination of youths and other local citizens and 
the end result of this is terrorism, which is now affecting some predominantly Muslim 
SSA countries like Mali and Nigeria. The model32 below visually explains how 












Diagram 1: Model of the thesis 
The diagram above explains how these charitable activities have influenced the minds 
of the local citizens and youths through Islamic schools, Mosques, and scholarships. 
                                                          
30 A more general studies have been done on the over all determinants and motives of Arab-aid, but 
only few studies have been dedicated to SSA specifically.  
31 The thesis does not intend to study the political and economic effects of Arab aid to SSA, but the 
socio-cultural impacts it has on the lives of people. The ways this Aid giving policies have shaped the 
lives of people. 

















The socio-cultural impact of this is that it has led to direct radicalization of youths. This 
impact coupled with abject poverty, illiteracy, corruption such as mismanagement of 
public funds, and lack of security and border control in some regions like the large 
Sahara Desert in some parts of Mali has led to terrorism. 
Research Limitations 
The major limitation to this study is: it does not take into consideration other Arab 
donors like Qatar, Libya before the civil war etc. Northern part of Africa which is also a 
favorable region to research in this study is not also included. Meanwhile the largest 
receivers of Arab humanitarian aid and assistance have been Morocco and Egypt 
respectively.33 The study also lacks accurate data to ascertain the total amount of aid 
that has been ascribed to the three countries in our case study due to Arab secrecy in its 
aid giving policies. I hope future research will discuss this issue profoundly in details 
with accurate and credible data. Some countries in SSA like Cote d’ivoire, Burkina 
Faso, and Cameroun that are susceptible to Arab aid and its influence are not also 
included in this study mainly due to lack of sufficient time and resources. 
  
                                                          




CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main objective of this chapter is to explicate the methodology and literatures that 
were used in this work. The chapter starts with the main research methodology and in 
the literature review part the determinants and motives of Arab aid is explained 
1.1. Research Methodology 
This study made use of qualitative research method and uses exploratory analysis- this 
is especially used to see how the flow of Arab aid to SSA increased as a result of the 
Iranian revolution of 1979. This analysis aims to explore the situation in its natural 
settings without referring to any main specific variable; this will help in describing the 
issue using non-numerical data to understand the phenomenon. Credible and reliable 
data will be used for the exploratory analysis. The study uses both primary and 
secondary data sources. The only principal primary data sources used, is based on case 
studies from the local population, on how they have been influenced by the Wahhabi-
trained preachers which are direct products of one of the charitable activities of Arab aid 
donors. The secondary data sources have been commonly used in past research. 
Secondary data sources are used because it is more reliable, cheap, easily accessed, and 
not time consuming like the primary data sources.  The main secondary data sources are 
taken from text books, articles in credible journals, magazines, policy documents, 
newspapers, documentaries, academic journals etc.  
The research in this study is more pertinent with our case study. The sample size (N) of 
case studies of this study is SSA and out of which a sample size (n) was chosen. This 
study encompasses 3 main SSA countries namely Senegal, Guinea, and Mali.34 It is 
imperative to note that 4235 SSA countries have all benefited from the Arab aid in one 
way or the other, but all in small quantities compared to the three countries mentioned 
above.  
                                                          
34 According to CIA Report (2018) the percentage of Muslim population in Guinea is 86.2, 94.8 for Mali, 
and 96.1% for Senegal. The three countries have also been the highest receiver of the Arab aid (Espen 
2007: 237). Apart from all this, Guinea, Mali and Senegal share a lot of things in common. They all 
neighboring countries. Some parts of Guinea and Mali have also for a long time been part of the same 
empire. UN Human Development Report (2018) also ranks the three countries as one of the poorest in 
the word.  




The main Arab aid donors in this study will be Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates.36 These aforementioned countries have so far been the largest provider of 
loans and grants in the Arab world to low income countries since the petroleum wealth 
growth (also known as the oil boom) of the 1970s.37 It should be kept in mind that 
accurate data cannot be provided to determine the exact amount of aid allocated to SSA 
since the petroleum wealth growth of the 1970s. This is because Arab aid flows are 
traditionally channeled via government channels and the aristocrats rulling families 
which are opaque to the public domain. This is particularly the case of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, which is known to have kept a part of its aid giving private and secret.38  
Taking into consideration of other literatures and past research studies, it appears that 
the Arab aid flows are being determined by several factors which include Islamic 
solidarity, Afro-Arab relationship, and same voting patterns with Arab countries in the 
United Nations, especially for Saudi Arabia, not having diplomatic relations with Israel, 
low income countries, and large population density39. These aid are being determined 
based on the factors mentioned above at 2 different stages. The organizational structure 
of Arab aid is divided into two- the national agencies which are also termed as the 
bilateral aid and the multilateral agencies. The national agencies are more concerned 
with giving out aid to other Arab countries while the multilaterals consider every other 
part of the world. The aforementioned three countries all have national aid agencies that 
have a common number of attributes. They all provide a whole range of aid, guarantees, 
loans, grants, and technical assistance to recipient countries.40 
                                                          
36 According to The World Bank (2010), Saudi Arabia is the highest Arab and Gulf donor, representing 
almost 67% of the Total Arab ODA. Saudi Arabia is followed by Kuwait in terms of providing sources of 
external assistance in the Gulf countries, representing about 16 percent of the total Arab ODA. United 
Arab Emirates is the third highest provider of Arab aid, representing about 12 percent of total Arab ODA. 
The World Bank, ‘’Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Co-operation,’’ 8-9. 
37 Arab and Gulf states came out as crucial and prime donors in the 1970s. Starting with the increase in 
oil prices in 1973, Arab oil-producing states received windfall profits from exports that lasted until the 
mid-1980s. McCormack, ‘’An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa,’’ 4. 
38 Van den Boogaerde, Pierre, Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institutions 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1991), 27. 
39 Neumayer, Ibid., 136-137. 




1.2. Research Design and Sampling Method 
This research consists of mainly three countries in the Sub-Sahara Africa out of forty 
two (42) countries in total, Guinea, Senegal, and Mali. These countries have more than 
85% of their population practicing Islam and they have so far being the three largest 
recipients of the Arab humanitarian aid and assistance, and loan.41  
Guinea 
Guinea, in long form is known as the Republic of Guinea, also known as Guinea-
Conakry- which is the name of its capital to differentiate it from neighboring Portuguese 
Guinea (Guinea-Bissau) and Equatorial Guinea in the Central part of the African 
continent. Guinea is located in West Africa. It took its independence from France on the 
2nd of October, 1958. The country is also known as the “Chateau d’eau d’Afrique’ 
which literally means the Water Tower of Africa because some rivers in West Africa 
have their root sources from the Guinean highlands. The country also owns a third of 
world bauxite reserves.42 
Guinea is on the Atlantic coast of West Africa. It is surrounded by Guinea-Bissau (385 
km of borders), Senegal (330 km), Mali (858 km), Ivory Coast (610 km), Liberia (563 
km), Sierra Leone (652 km) and the Atlantic Ocean. The country has four main 
geographical areas: a coastal zone, Lower Guinea, Maritime Guinea or Kakandé, a 
mountainous area, Middle Guinea, which includes the Fouta-Djalon massif, a savanna 
zone in the north-east, Upper Guinea, or Mandé, an area of forests in the southeast, the 
forested Guinea.43 
These four zones, sometimes called "natural regions", do not correspond to the 
administrative regions44. 
The president of Guinea who is also the head of both the state and government is 
generally elected directly by the people. The legislative body of Guinea is the 
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44 See "Guinea." WorldMark Encyclopedia of Nations, Encyclopedia.com. 
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unicameral assembly which is also elected by the people. The Supreme Court which is 
the country’s highest court of appeal is also responsible for the judiciary system45.  
The majority of the Guineans are Muslims representing about 85% of the total 
population. The population of Guinea is divided into twenty-four distinct ethnic groups. 
Alhough, the official language of the country is French, which is the language of public 
administration, media and communication, education and business, other languages are 
also spoken by the majority of the population. 
The economy of Guinea is largely dependent on mineral exploitation and the 
agricultural sector46. Guinea is the second largest producer of bauxite and has reserves 
of diamonds and gold47. 
In 2011, the US Government stated that abuse by the security forces and the abuse of 
women and children constituted human rights abuses in Guinea.48 In 2014, the country 
was at the heart of the Ebola epidemic which caused the death of thousands of Guineans 
and also led to economic decline.49 
We included Guinea in our research because it’s a predominantly Muslim country with 
about 10 million of its population practicing Islam. Apart from this, Guinea also has a 
strong historical link with the Arabs from the Northern part of the African continent 
who introduced Islam through trade.50 The country has also been a major receiver of 
both Arab bilateral and multilateral aid with about 1 billion dollars in loans, financial 
and technical assistance, humanitarian aid etc. The central Mosque in the capital city 
was also financed by Saudi Arabia51 and most of its Imams are Wahhabi trained 
                                                          
45 Zeilig Leo and David Seddon, A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa (Philadelphia: 
Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2005). 
46 See Arulpragasam Jehan, Economic Transition in Guinea: Implications for Growth and Poverty, (New 
York: Cornell University Food and Nutrition Press, 1997). 
47 U.S. Geological Survey, “Bauxite and Alumina,” 2013. 
48 U.S. Department of State, Guinea 2016 Human Rights Report: Bureau of Democracy, (Washington, DC 
2016), 2. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265474.pdf  
49 World Health Organization, Ebola Situation Report: World Health Organization, (March 2016), 3. 
http://apps.who.int/ebola/sites/default/files/atoms/files/who_ebola_situation_report_06-01-
2016.pdf?ua=1  
50 Jalloh, ‘’The Policies of Black African States towards the Arab World,’’ 21 




scholars52. Every year, thousands of people leave the country to perform the pilgrimage 
which is considered as one of the pillars of Islam. 
Senegal 
Senegal, in its long form is known as the Republic of Senegal, it is also located in West 
Africa. It is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Mauritania to the north, to the 
east by Mali, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to the south. The Gambia forms a quasi-
enclave in Senegal, penetrating more than 300 km inland. The Cape Verde Islands are 
located 560 km from the Senegalese coast. The country owes its name to the river that 
borders on the east and north and has its source in Fouta Djallon in Guinea. The climate 
is tropical and dry with two seasons: the dry season and the rainy season53 
The current territory of Senegal has seen the development of several kingdoms 
including Wolof, vassals of successive empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai. After 
1591, the country suffered the West African political fragmentation following the Battle 
of Tondibi. In the seventeenth century, several trading posts belonging to different 
European colonial empires established along the coast, serving as a support for the 
triangular trade. France is gradually gaining the upper hand over the other powers and 
erects Saint-Louis, Goree, Dakar and Rufisque in French communes governed by the 
status of the Four Commons54. With the Industrial Revolution, France wanted to build a 
railroad to connect them and came into conflict with the Damel Cayor, Lat Dior. This 
conflict allowed France to officially make Cayor a protectorate in 1886, one year after 
the end of the Berlin conference55. The colonization of all of West Africa is then 
initiated and Saint Louis, then Dakar will become the two successive capitals of French 
West Africa created in 1895. Dakar then becomes the capital of the Senegalese Republic 
at the time of independence in 196056. The country is part of ECOWAS. Since April 2, 
2012, the president of the country is Macky Sall. Senegal is also part of the African 
Union (AU), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CES) and the International 
Organization of La Francophonie. 
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Senegal is known as the 4th largest economy in the West African sub-region after 
Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana (World Bank 2010). Given its geographical location 
and its political stability, Senegal is one of the most industrialized African countries 
with the presence of multinationals who are mainly of French origin and to a lesser 
extent American. In addition, Senegal is one of the most industrialized countries in the 
West African group, since there are several multinationals. The country's labor force is 
divided as follows: 15.5% is devoted to agriculture, 21.7% to industries and 62.3% to 
services.57 
Compared to other countries on the African continent, Senegal is very poor in natural 
resources; its main revenue comes from fishing, tourism and services: fishing is the 
main source of foreign exchange in Senegal.58  
There are various beliefs and religions in Senegal. The Senegalese population is 
overwhelmingly Muslim (about 95%). This Sunni Islam is essentially of Sufi tradition 
and it’s known for its tolerance and openness to otherness. The Islamization of the 
country dates back to the eleventh century,59 at which time the Almoravids conquered 
northern Senegal. The two main dominant Muslim brotherhoods are Tidjaniyya and 
Mouridiyya. The appearance of Christianity is much more recent. Today, Christians 
(Catholics, Evangelicals, and Protestants) represent 4% of the population of Senegal. 
Finally, animism 1%, with its rites and beliefs, is still present and is practiced mainly in 
the South-East of the country.60 Elsewhere the country often cohabits with other 
religions. Senegal is a model for peaceful religious coexistence. At various religious 
festivals, Senegalese have the habit of offering meals to their neighbors practicing other 
religions. 
Mali 
Mali, in its long form is known as the Republic of Mali, is a country in West Africa, 
bordering Mauritania and Algeria to the north, Niger to the east, Burkina Faso and Côte 
d'Ivoire to the south, Guinea to the southwest and Senegal to the west. 
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Colonial conquest from the colony of Senegal was slow and the entities gradually 
annexed were grouped under the name Haut-Fleuve, the territory under military 
command with Kayes as its chief town and headed by a superior commander. By decree 
of 18 August 1888, the Haut-Fleuve became an autonomous administrative entity of the 
colony of Senegal under the name of French Sudan61. Its first owner, the battalion chief 
Louis Archinard, who succeeded Gallieni on May 10, 1888, became truly the first 
superior commander. By decree of October 22, 1890, the superior commander exercised 
the guardianship over the administrative services. By decree of August 27, 1892 the 
French Sudan became an autonomous colony and Archinard, was promoted lieutenant-
colonel in May 1890, becoming the first governor and acceded to the rank of colonel in 
September 1892. 
Former French colony of French Sudan, Mali became independent on September 22, 
1960, after the breakup of the Mali Federation regrouping Senegal and the Sudanese 
Republic. Its motto is "a people, a goal, and a faith" and its flag consists of three vertical 
color; green, yellow and red stripes. 
The Republic of Mali has preserved the borders inherited from colonization, those of 
French Sudan. Previously, several kingdoms and empires succeeded one another, 
encompassing a more or less important part of present-day Mali and bordering 
countries. 
With 15 million residents, the Malian population is made up of different ethnic groups, 
the main ones being the Bambara, the Bobo, the Bozo, the Dogon, the Khassonké, the 
Malinke, the Minianka, the Peul, the Sénoufos, the Soninké (or Sarakolés), the 
Sonrhaïs, the Touaregs, the Toucouleurs.62 French is the official language, but the 
majority of the population speaks the national languages, with Bambara being the most 
widely used and serving, in addition to French, a lingua franca. 
With a still largely rural economy, Mali, a landlocked country is one of the 48 least 
developed countries (LDCs) in terms of socio-economic development.63 The country, 
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just like the two other countries in our case study is part of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. 
Bamako, a southwestern city with 1,809,106 inhabitants in 2009, is the capital of the 
country. 
According to data from the CIA World Factbook (2010), Islam is the main religion 
practiced in Mali (90%) while Catholics, Protestants and Animists account for about 
10%. Introduced in the 11th century, Sunni Islam is the religion of nearly 90% of the 
Malian population. Its expansion in Mali found an anchorage in regions and cities like 
Timbuktu, center of propagation of Islam with its university and its madrassas, which 
was the intellectual and spiritual capital between the fifteenth and the sixteenth century. 
Religion is ubiquitous in One of the famous places of Christianity in Mali is the city of 
Kita in the region of Kayes. It is in this region that the Notre-Dame cathedral where the 
annual Catholic pilgrimage in Mali takes place64. 
1.3. Literature Review 
Zimmermann and Smith (2011)65 categorized aid donors in 3 divergent types of 
development cooperation donors, and according to these two authors; the main Arab aid 
donors (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate) belong to the third category as 
visible actors in giving out developmental aid and humanitarian assistance with donor 
status. 
According to Eric Neumayer (2003)66 the main determinants of Arab aid to other 
countries are Arab solidarity, Muslim countries, Afro-Arab connections, poor countries, 
countries that have the same voting pattern with Saudi Arabia at the U.N security 
council, countries that don’t maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and socialist 
countries. Neumayer (2003)67 also analyzed the two stages that ascertain the final 
allotment of the Arab aid (gate-keeping stage and level stage). This aforementioned 
theory shows the significance of the article. It is tested that countries that survive the 
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second stage (level stage) are selected based on their numbers of population and low 
economic development. According to this article socialist countries are highly 
insignificant in both stages. SSA countries, Arab countries and Islamic countries are 
proved to be significant factors in Arab aid Allocation.68 This article spoke about most 
of my determinants of Arab aid in SSA countries; the only difference is the article was 
dedicated to Arab aid to every other country in general, it wasn’t directed to one region 
and in my opinion these determinants and motives can change depending on the region 
they are interested in giving aid to, the determinants and motives of a given receiving 
country can also differ depending on the motives being pursued there. 
Espen Villanger (2007)69 made a study to investigate the policies and streams of Arab 
aid, and contrast them with the holistic image of Western aid policies and practices. The 
article analyses the aid patterns, determinants, and motives of the three principal Arab 
aid donor countries mentioned in this thesis, and then contrasts their aid motives with 
Western aid policies in general. The article also shows that 42 SSA countries in total 
have received Arab aid but the only three countries in these SSA nations to have 
obtained not less than 1% of the aggregate Arab aid and humanitarian assistance are 
Senegal, Mali, and Guinea.70 This is why these three countries are included in our 
countries’ case studies. These three countries also justify the hypothesis that religious 
motives or goals is a blatant determinant of Arab aid, because the aforementioned 
countries are predominantly Muslims with more than 85% of their population adhering 
to one of the sects of Islam. The article also shows that Arab aid donors pursue 
commercial interest and foreign policy goals in giving out aid, but they are less 
concerned with economic and political policies of the receiving country.71 This is the 
major difference between the Arab aid donors and its Western counterparts. The article 
also clarifies that considerable sums of Arab aid is also directed to countries that are 
primarily Muslims, and lending in accordance with the Sharia law is promoted 
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concurrently in these receiving countries. Finally, the article states that as at the end of 
2005, only about 15% of the Arab aid has been allocated to SSA.72 
Another study by Eric Neumayer (2002)73 spoke and scrutinized the two main 
dimensions of Arab aid which are national (bilateral) and multilateral aid agencies. The 
both were examined in details. The article also gave some information on the motives 
behind Arab aid, the geographical dispersion and the sectorial dispersion of the Arab 
aid. An example of such multilateral agency is the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa 
(SAAFA), which was founded in the early 1970s concurrently with the Arab Bank for 
Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) to help African countries overcome the 
balance of payments problems, especially pertaining to financing oil exports.74 
In an article titled “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa” published by the 
Financial Action Task Forced (FATF 2016)75 states that some terrorist organizations are 
financed internally and externally mainly through donations.76 Though, the authors 
argue that these donations are giving for religious purposes such as zakat and the givers 
have no knowledge about the use of these donations to carry out terrorist attacks and 
operation. Why I mentioned this article here is to denounce this claim of the authors and 
to testify that some of the donors’ intention is to promote some kinds of ideologies. In 
general this article spoke about the source of terrorist financing in Central and West 
Africa77. It gave information and case studies on some confirmed resources for terrorist 
to take out operations. Some of these confirmed sources include extortion, robbery and 
looting, cattle or livestock rustling, commercial enterprises, and abuse of non-profit 
organizations. The study also made mention of other possible sources of terrorist 
financing, but they weren’t confirmed, these include illicit trafficking such as human 
trafficking for ransoms, drug trafficking, and weapons trafficking. The study also shows 
that terrorist financing has changed over time due to extinctions, mergers and 
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transformations. Emphasizing that the nature of financing could change according to 
allegiances of one terrorist group to other designated terrorist organizations.78 
Abuza (2003)79 argued that some of the amounts alloted to charitable and humanitarian 
activities have been automatically redirected towards terrorist and radical organizations 
because some members of this terrorist and rebel organization have placed some of their 
committed and trusted men in leadership positions in various religious charity 
organizations. This was the case for Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and Jemmah 
Islamiyah (JI) in some of the Asian countries.80 
In the period from 1975 to 2005, only Saudi Arabia humanitarian aid to low income and 
developing countries totalled approximately 90 billion dollars.81 According to these 
authors Saudi Arabia is incoherent and disorganized in its humanitarian aid structure 
and there’s no central agency to monitor and coordinate its aid assistance to low income 
or developing countries. This is the case for its other Arab aid donor counterparts. One 
crucial importance of this article is that it clearly states that Saudi Arabia humanitarian 
aid and assistance is a redoubtable source of soft power82 i.e. to win the mind and heart 
of the developing countries, particularly in the Muslim world, in order for them to 
spread their Wahhabi doctrine and probably to have commercial interests in some of 
these countries. This could be the case of China and India who are both countries with 
strategic partnership. Although this article clearly states that Saudi authorities and 
citizens believe that their charitable activities are formulated based on the needs of the 
recipients irrespective of whom they are.83 
Saudi aid and Arab aid in general has been directed towards Arab and Muslim 
countries, but Saudi government officials have denied this fact by clarifying that every 
low income and developing country is qualified for its humanitarian assistance 
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regardless of race, religion, and color. Saudi proved this statement by providing fifty 
million dollars to the UN Emergency Relief Fund for Haiti. This article also states that 
the main aid motives of Saudi Arabia in particular are humanitarian principles, 
charitable giving as zakat and sadaqa, history and destiny to be the leader of the Muslim 
world and soft power (Khalid and Nathalie 2011: 25). 
1.3.1. Determinants and Motives of Arab Aid to SSA 
According to Neumayer (2003)84 from a time period of 1974-1994, Arab aid donors 
have on average contributed about13.5 percent of aggregate aid and loans by all aid 
providers and donors including the Western European countries and the United States of 
America. He further stated that; Arab aid is distinctive in form from other aid because it 
is largely determined by factors such as Arab and Islamic solidarity.  
Arab countries 
According to Van den Boogaerde (1991),85 Arab nations were the principal recipients 
and donees of the Arab aid in the beginning of Arab aid allotment. Some multilateral 
agencies were created at that time for mainly giving financial and technical assistance to 
Arab countries. A good example of this was GODE, The Gulf Organization for The 
Development of Egypt, but according to the same author other bilateral and multilateral 
agencies showed a favorable bias towards other Arab countries. This favoritism of 
assisting only the Arab countries in the beginning of Arab aid allotment can be termed 
the ‘Arab Solidarity’. This argument can also be supported by a statement in the Arab 
Fund for Economic and Social Development which states that the main objective of the 
Fund is to give; priority to projects which are important to the Arab world and to inter-
Arab relations.86  
Arab aid donors in general like to portray this (aid giving to Arab countries) as a 
dynamic and active example of Arab solidarity between the aid providers and their 
substandard neighbouring nations.87 But some critical studies such as the one by Hunter 
(1984)88 see this as a way to reduce or eliminate the threats by more populous, jealous, 
                                                          
84 Neumayer, Ibid., 135. 
85 Van den Boogaerde, Ibid., 19-21. 
86 AFESD, Kuwait: Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, (Annual Report, 1999), 5. 
87 Khaldi Mohamed, ‘’Arab Aid in the World Economy’’. in Achilli and Khaldi, (1984), 7-39. 




and greedy neighbors in convincing them to accept that friendly relations are more 
beneficial than hostility would be.89 This author further argues that aid policies of the 
Arab aid providers that are also part of the OPEC have been mainly influenced by their 
economic, ideological, political and security objectives. From the aforementioned 
explanations, one can say that the motive behind the Arab solidarity determinant is not 
to assist other Poor Arab countries, but to secure their security and the territorial 
integrity of the main Arab aid donors. 
Afro-Arab Unity 
Based on the historical strong connection and links between Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Arab nations which started since the period of the Trans-Saharan trade, one other 
important factor that determines the allocation of Arab-aid is the Afro-Arab solidarity. 
After the Arab countries, Sub-Saharan Africa comes next as the second region that has 
been financed by the Arab aid donors mainly due to the strong links between them90. 
This argument is supported by the existence of some organizations such as BADEA and 
the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab countries (AFTAAC). 
According to Porter91, these organizations were created during the commitments made 
at the Afro-Arab summit meeting in Cairo in March, 1977. In a statistical analysis by 
Neumayer (2003),92 this determinant was proven to be statistically significant in the 
allocation of the Arab aid.  
The motive behind this Afro-Arab solidarity as a determinant can also be explained as a 
way of promoting some Islamic ideologies and as a way of keeping them committed to 
the religion. Islam was brought to this region during the Trans-Saharan trade, which was 
mainly based on the exchange of golds, slaves etc. Islam came to SSA before 
Christianity; Christianity was introduced by the Portuguese explorers and other 
Europeans. In this case, one can say that the main motive behind this Afro-Arab 
solidarity is to hinder the spread of Christianity in the region and foster more adherences 
to Islamic principles and laws by the people of this region.  
Islamic Countries 
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According to Mertz and Mertz (1983)93, one of the important determinants of Arab-aid 
allotment is ‘Islamic countries’. That is, the principal recipients of the Arab-aid are 
Muslim countries. This can be testified from the countries given in our case studies, 
which have above 85 percent of their total population practicing Islam. Although, these 
are not the most populous countries in SSA or countries with larger Muslim population. 
But, when we look at the religious demographic distribution of SSA countries, the three 
countries of our case studies are largely Muslim populated compared to other countries 
of SSA with the exception of Niger, which also have a substantial amount of Muslim 
population and it has so far also received a large amount of humanitarian aid and 
assistance from the Arab-aid donors. 
Though some authors such as Khaldi (1984)94 opposes the proposition that Islamic 
countries might have been favored by Arab-aid. He claims that Arab aid does not posses 
any religious content. This statement can be opposed by claims such as the multilateral 
agencies like the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) which only finances projects in 
member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference. It should not also be 
forgotten that Arab countries are major contributors to IDB, but not the only 
contributors.  
In the debate whether the Arab-aid has any religious characteristics, Porter (1986)95, 
takes a central space by believing that the Islamic relationship while in existence, 
appears to be relatively insignificant as a determinant underlying the Arab aid giving 
and its dispensation. Some other studies also argued that lending in accordance with the 
Sharia law is also promoted simultaneously; this proves the statement that Arab-aid is 
mostly ascertained to Islamic nations.  
Neumayer (2003)96 also approximately calculates that Islamic nations obtain a share of 
bilateral Arab ODA that is 118 percent higher than for countries that are non Islamic. 
Same Voting Pattern 
                                                          
93 Mertz, Robert Anton and Pamela MacDonald, Mertz, Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1983). 
94 Khaldi Mohamed. ‘’Arab Aid in the World Economy,’’ 7-39 
95 Porter R.S, ‘’Arab Economic Aid,’’ 44-68 





Another factor that determines the Arab-aid allocation is countries that have the same or 
close foreign policy stands with them, such as the same voting pattern in the United 
Nations General Assembly meetings. In a statistical analysis by Neumayer (2003),97 
countries with the same voting pattern especially similar to that of Saudi Arabia in the 
UN General Assembly are more suitable to be qualified for both bilateral and 
multilateral aid packages compared to countries that don’t have the same voting pattern, 
but these countries, once selected and qualified obtain more aid and assistance from the 
Arab multilateral agencies. This clearly shows that voting similarity in the UN General 
Assembly has a significant effect in determining Arab-aid allocation. 
But, this is not the case for only Arab-aid donors. A study by Alesina and Dollar 
(2000)98 also refers to this same voting pattern as the ‘UN Friend’. Their results shows 
that the UN friend variable is generally significant and, in particular, is significant for 
all the major players in International relations included in their regressions, these 
players include the U.S, Japan, France, Germany, and the U.K. 
The correlation of their UN friend variables and aid flows can be interpreted in two 
ways. Firstly, aid is used to buy political support in the UN, that is, aid buys UN votes 
in favor of the donor which causes the same pattern in UN vote. The second 
interpretation is that UN votes are a reliable indication of the political alliances between 
countries and that these political alliances determine aid flows.99 This argument testifies 
the motive that Arab-aid donors, most especially Saudi Arabia use its foreign aid and 
humanitarian assistance for strategic purposes. 
Diplomatic Relationship with Israel 
Countries that often have close ties with Israel or that have strong diplomatic 
relationship with them are mostly disqualified in Arab-aid giving policies. For instance, 
in 1985, the Kuwait Foreign minister stated that countries that have diplomatic relations 
with Israel will not be qualified as recepients of the Kuwait Fund100 This is primarily 
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due to the issues concerning the Israel-Arab conflict. Most of the predominantly Muslim 
countries in SSA closed Israel embassies and cut-off other relationships with them after 
the 6-day war of 1967 that was fought between Israel and Arab countries. Although 
Israel started providing financial assistance, most especially technical assistance to SSA 
countries immediately after decolonization, but Saudi Arabia was able to convince some 
SSA countries to terminate diplomatic relationships with Israel by giving them enough 





CHAPTER 2: ARAB AID TO SSA IN BROAD PERSPECTIVE 
The main aims of this chapter is to ascertain the principal concepts and terms that are 
used in this thesis. This chapter talks about the Arab aid in broad terms. It starts by 
defining what Arab aid is, the Bilateral and Multilateral forms of Arab aid giving are 
also discussed in this chapter. And finally, the chapter also talks about Sub-Saharan 
Africa and its relations with the Arab world. 
2.1. Arab Aid 
Arab aid donors have been among the most prolific and active international donors of 
foreign aid. From the period of 1973 to 2008, they had an official development 
assistance (ODA) averaging 13 percent of the global ODA.101 One striking 
characteristics of Arab countries’ foreign aid since its start has been their outstanding 
generosity. Arab aid averaged 4.7 percent of their combined GNI102 in the period from 
its commencement to 1978 while the DAC countries averaged 0.3 percent in the same 
period.103 
So many different and diverse definitions of aid exist in the literature of foreign aid. 
According to Qian N. (2014)104 foreign aid is one of the most imperative policy 
mechanisms that rich and developed countries use for helping poor and undeveloped 
countries to improve the standard of living and facilitate economic and institutional 
development. 
                                                          
101 Waltz Julie and Ramachandran Vijaya, ‘’Brave New World: A literature Review of Emerging Donors 
and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance,’’ Working Papers, no. 273 (2011): 12, Center for Global 
Development, Washington. 
102 ‘’The donors’ gross national income (GNI) at market prices is the sum of gross primary incomes 
receivable by resident institutional units and sectors. In contrast, gross national product (GDP) measures 
the value of the total production within a country and does not include income and profits going into or 
out of the country. Hence, for aid givers, especially large donors, GNI gives a more accurate measure of 
the burden of giving relative to the donor’s income’’ 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1507/GDP_and_GNI.html 
103 Van den Boogaerde (1990) uses data for the following Arab donors: Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Van den Boogaerde Pierre, ‘’The Composition and Distribution of Financial 
Assistance from Arab countries and Arab Regional Institutions,’’ IMF Working Paper, (1990): 67 
104 Qian Nancy, ‘’Making Progress on Foreign Aid,’’ Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 7 (2015):277.  






The quote below comes from the United Nation Resolution of 1970, which advocated 
rich and developed nations to assist poor and low income countries. This was taken 
from the United nations millinium goals. 
“In recognition of the special importance of the role that can be fulfilled only 
by official development assistance, a major part of financial resource transfers to 
the developing countries should be provided in the form of official development 
assistance. Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its 
official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best 
efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product 
at market prices by the middle of the decade.” (UN 1970, paragraph 43)105 
The central theme of this thesis focuses on aid as a foreign policy tools that serve the 
interest of the donor and not to contribute much to the economic and social development 
of the receiving country. 
The idea of co-ordination between the Arab funds began in 1974 when these funds’ 
providers became aware of the need to cooperate in order to make the most of their 
respective resources and thus improve the effectiveness of the assistance provided. 
Regional Arab development institutions are the main source of aid to developing 
countries and since 1974 the coordination group of eight Arab funding institutions has 
been steadily making the necessary efforts to mobilize the financing needed to develop 
the economies of the developing countries that is, the beneficiary countries.106 The Arab 
aid group was characterized by its capacity to finance major projects, that a single 
institution can not finance. Believing in the importance of financing for development, 
the coordinating group's institutions continue to provide assistance to developing 
countries. Since 1975, these individual institutions have coordinated their effort to 
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achieve common objectives aimed at improving the living conditions of populations and 
reducing poverty.107 
The coordination group now comprises eight institutions, five of which are multilateral 
in character: the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International 
Development, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Bank for 
Economic Development in Africa, the Arab Golf Program for Support to United 
Nations Organizations, and three national institutions, namely the Abu Dhabi 
Development Fund, the Saudi Development Fund and the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development.108 
2.1.1. Bilateral 
Bilateral aid is mostly from a government to a government. The main institution 
responsibly for the allocation of this type of aid in the Arab World is the Ministry of 
Finance. Most Arab bilateral aid are transparent, though, no clear and precise account 
and data can be given on it, principally due to the fact that arab bilateral aid are done in 
secret.109 
The three bilateral aid mentioned in this work are, Abu Dhabi Development Fund, 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, and the Saudi Fund for Developement. 
Abu Dhabi Development Fund 
The Abu Dhabi Fund was established by the Government of Abu Dhabi on 15 July 1971 
as an independent governmental institution. The Fund, which began operations in 
September 1974, provides economic assistance to developing countries in the form of 
loans, equity and technical assistance, in the various fields of economic development, in 
addition to other related activities and objectives of the Fund. The Fund also creates 
financial institutions in support of its activities.110 
                                                          
107 The Coordination Group is also called the Coordination Secretariat. It does not have its own official 
website neither does it publish the statistical information online. Eric Neumayer, ‘’Arab Related Bilateral 
and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance,’’ 5 
108 Ibid 
109 Nonneman Gerd. Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1988). 





ADFD was first created in July,1975 as an autonomous non profit institution that is 
under the control of Abu Dhabi government. It first started as an agency for financing 
development of needy Arab countries and it started operation in Africa in 1975. Its 
principal aim is to be a model institution for providing development and humanitarian 
assistance to alleviate global poverty, most especially to underdeveloped countries and 
its mission is to help low income countries and underdeveloped countries to attain 
sustainable economic development and to reduce the rate of poverty by assisting low 
income countries with financial resources, forming partnerships in the public and 
private sectors.111 By doing this, it adopts an international best practice to ensure aid 
effectiveness between its government and the recipient countries. 
ADFD targets to assist developing countries to attain durable socio-economic growth, 
mainly through humanitarian and financial assistance in forms of equities, government 
grants and concessionary loans. It also carefully studies investments in details in order 
to encourage the private sector in the recipient countries who play an imperative role in 
accelerating the economic growth.112 
In 2017, the ADFD contributed to 99 million US Dollars farming investment in 3 
African Countries, Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal.113 And as at ending 2017, the 
ADFD has also made 66 projects in 28 SSA Countries.114 
The cumulative gross development finance provided until 1997 is relatively small 
compared to the two other Arab main donors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Coordination 
Secterait)115 
                                                          
111 Arab Decision, “Abu Dhabi Fund for Development – General Description,” (2003) accessed at 
www.arabdecision.net/show_func_3_12_12_0_3_4628.htm 
112 See Abu Dhabi Digital Government. 
https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/departments/adfd;jsessionid=-hGgfmVlOnhg_yg-
5GTNSrr5ZB4SPXfyOfoHR1AxAR0p2NbLOOJ7!-613942789!-1370027656!1523111060837 accessed on 
01/04/2018 
113 The National Staff, ‘’ Abu Dhabi funding contributes to $99m farming investment in three African 
countries,’’ UAE, (2017). https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/abu-dhabi-funding-contributes-
to-99m-farming-investment-in-three-african-countries-1.22127 
114 See Abu Dhabi Development Fund’s official website: 
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/abu-dhabi-funding-contributes-to-99m-farming-
investment-in-three-african-countries-1.22127  
115 The Coordination Sectariat for Arab National and Regional Development Institutions was created 





Distribution of Project Loans by Sector (cumulated until end-2003): 
Sector  % of total  
Social Sectors  4.1%  
Agriculture & Agro-industry  18.4%  
Industry  17.5%  
Electricity & Water Provision  23.9%  
Construction & Housing  6.3%  
Transport & Telecommunications  24.8%  
Hotels & Tourism  3.7%  
Other  1.4%  
Total 100% 
   Source: OFID (2004, 32) 
This table shows information for the sectorial distribution for the Abu Dhabi 
Development Fund. The table gathers the sectorial distribution from the commencement 
of the Abu Dhabi Development Fund to 2003, and from the table above we can see that 
the fund has contributed more to the transport and telecommunications sectors, followed 
by electricity and water provision sector.  
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
The Kuwaiti Fund was established by the State of Kuwait on 31 December 1961, and 
began its activities in March 1962. It aims to provide the required assistance to Arab 
countries and other developing and low income countries to contribute to the 
development of their economies through the allocation of loans necessary for the 
implementation of development programmes, in addition to the provision of guarantees, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
together the eight most important aid agencies of the Arab World. Neumayer, ‘’Arab-Related Bilateral 




grants and participation in the capital of development institutions116. It is the first Arab 
National Aid agency, it is regarded as a proof of the success of Kuwait Fund that a lot of 
other Arab development funds have used it as a model.117 
About 109 countries in total benefits from Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development. This fund also provides technical assistance, and it also invest in financial 
institutions of different countries. The main sectors that receive finances from this fund 
are irrigation, agriculture, transport, industry and energy.118 
Kuwait adhered to the African Develoment Bank (AFDB) and the African Development 
Fund (ADF) in 1975. Since then, it has regularly contributed to the reconstitution of 
ADF resources. In 2009, the realization of certain projects of the Bank (AFDB) was 
given to Kuwaiti enterprises119 
The partnership between the AFDB and Kuwait relates to the co-financing of 
developmental projects and activities through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development (KFAED), established in 1961. KFAED aims to provide assistance to all 
developing countries but, priority is given to the Arab countries. The Fund, which 
administers Kuwait's bilateral and multilateral assistance, co-financed the Bank's 
technical assistance projects, programs and operations. The aid Africa receives from 
Kuwait is in the form of concessional loans. This support for the development of Africa 
by the Kuwaiti government and Kuwait's efforts in fighting against poverty in the 
African continent are widely welcomed by the AFDB member states.120 For instance 
from 1976 to 2013 Kuwaiti government has invested about 200 billion franc CFA121 in 
Senegal, which has so far been the largest receipient country of the Kuwaiti fund, 
                                                          
116 See the KFAED’s official website at https://www.kuwait-fund.org/en/web/kfund  
117 McKinnon Michael, Friends in Need-The Kuwait Fund in the Developing World, (London and New 
York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 79 
118 See also: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, www.kuwait-fund.org  
119 Emeka ANUFORO, ‘’La BAD et la BID signent un nouvel accord de 2 milliards de dollars pour des 
programmes en faveur de l’énergie, des PME et du développement humain en Afrique,’’ Groupe De La 
Banque Africaine de Developpement, December, 2017. https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/afdb-
islamic-development-bank-sign-new-us-2-billion-deal-to-fund-energy-smes-human-development-
programs-17173/ accessed on 12/12/2017. 
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having about 15,3 percent of the total grants and loan from 2004-2005.122 The Fund 
supported Senegal in the development of the Senegal River Basin, which is a 1,086 long 
river in the Western part of Africa that forms the border between Senegal and 
Mauritania, the Débi-Lampsar irrigation project, the Dialakoto-Kédougou road, the 
rehabilitation of Touba-Kébémer-Lompoul road etc. In 2012, the Fund contributed more 
than 24 billion franc CFA123 to the financing of the 3rd section of the Voie de 
Degagement Nord (VDN) in Dakar. It has also helped to build the road infrastructure 
set up within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 
Other countries of the subregion such as Benin has also received an amount of 96.139 
million dollars, while Burkina Faso has received (170 million dollars), Côte d'Ivoire 
(41,582 million), Guinea (165 million), Mali (153 million) and The Gambia (91 million) 
respectively124. 
The Saudi Fund for Development 
The Saudi Fund was established by royal decree on 1 September 1974 as an agency 
through which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia grants bilateral aid to developing 
countries. Starting in March 1975, the Fund provides loans on concessional terms for 
the financing of projects and for the restructuring of the economies of the countries 
concerned. It pays particular attention to projects aimed at improving the living 
conditions of the poor in the least developed countries.125 Saudi Arabia has also 
provided funds for the other Multilateral agencies.126 
                                                          
122 KFAED, Annual Report, 2005. 
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126 For example, Saudi Arabia provides 27% of the budget of the Islamic Development Bank, 15% of the 
Arab 
Monetary Fund, 30% of the OPEC Fund for International Development and 25% of the Arab Bank for 




For a period of 38 years i.e. from 1975-2013, the Saudi Fund for Development has 
provided 332 loans and aid in financing 318 developmental projects in 44 African 
countries of which 40 are in Sub-Saharan Africa127 
The total value of this aid is approximately 5,758.14 million dollars, and these loans 
were allocated to the transportation and communication sector, with about 108 projects 
that represents 28.65% of the total loans allocated to Africa.128 The fund has also 
financed 65 projects and programs pertaining to the field of agriculture which represents 
22.63% of its total loans.129 
The table below shows the total share of projects and amounts dedicated to the three 
main countries in the case study of this thesis namely Guinea, Mali, and Senegal of 
SFD’s 318 projects and programs that have been allocated to Africa from 1975-2013130 
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Saudi Total amount of Projects and Amounts dedicated to the Countries in our 
Case Study (The amounts are in SR million) 
Name of Country Number of Projects Amount 
Guinea 16 731.37 
Senegal 21 713.09 
Mali 14 961.42 
Source data: SFD Statistics 2015 
It should be noted that though Nigeria has more Muslim population than these 3 
countries but the latters are predominantly Muslim countries with about 85% of their 
population adhering to the religion. These 3 aforementioned countries have also been 
the largest reciever of the Saudi Fund for Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.131 And 
Senegal so far has also been the largest receiver of the Kuwaiti Fund in SSA.132 
The following tables also shows the name and amount in SR million of signed loan 
agreements between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 3 countries in our case study 
between the period of 1975 to 2016.133 
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132 Kuwait Fund for Development, Annual Report, (2014-2015), 87. https://www.kuwait-
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Projects signed between Saudi Arabia and Guinea (SR million) 
Project name Amount 
Feasibility study, Design and Specifications for Guekedou-N’zerekore Road 3.37 
Guekedou-N’zerekore Road 133.63 
Education Development 24 
Construction and Equipping of Rural Health Centers 15 
Social and Economic Sectors Support 21 
Health Development 34 
Supply of Water for Seven Towns 45 
Seredou-N’zerekore Road 70 
Integrated Rural Development in Forecariah 26 
Gafiri Dam for Hydo-Electric Power 74 
Gafiri Dam for Hydo-Electric Power (Additional loan) 36 
Tombo-Gbessia Road 56.25 
Rural Intermediate Schools 45 
Komba-Boummehoun Road 58.12 
Construction and Equipping Eight Vocational Schools (ERAM) 90 
Rehabilitaion and Extension of Donka Hospital in Conakry 120 
Total 851.37 
Source Data: Annual Report of the Saudi Fund For Devopment, 2016 
The table above gives the names and costs of projects that have been signed between 
Guinea and Saudi Arabia, since it started giving humanitarian assistance to low income 
countries. The total amount of this projects has been 851.37 million SR Dollars. This 
table does not include the agreements and projects that have been signed between the 
two countries after 2016. The total number of the projects is 17, this is different from 
the first table, the first table does not include the rehabilitation and extension of the 
Donka Hospital. The rehabilitation and extension of Donka Hospital in Conakry is still 
under construction as at March, 2018. The first project for the construction of 8 
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Projects signed between Saudi Arabia and Mali (SR million) 
Project Name Amount 
Agricultural and Housing Development, Study of the Sixth Region’s Irrigation 
System 
16.05 
Selingue Dam 50.3 
West Coastal Livestock (Sahel Livestock) 46.85 
Sevare-Gao Road 33.35 
Sevare-Gao Road (Additional Loan) 16.58 
Selingue Dam Project Completion 3.73 
Development of the Senegal River Basin OMVS 196.13 
Public Enterprise Support 22 
Second Bridge in Bamako 75.62 
Economic Development Support 7 
Goubo Plateau Agricultural Project in the South Region 9.97 
Internal Linking Roads in Bamako Area 50.51 
Kayes-Bafoulabe Road 35 
Construction of Taosa Dam 93.75 
Construction of Djenne Dam under the Irrigation Development Program of 
Selingue Basin (Phase 1) 
56.25 
Total 713.09 
Source Data: Annual Report of the Saudi Fund For Devopment, 2016 
According to this table, which was extracted from the annual report of the Saudi Fund 
for Development (2016). Mali has received a total number of 15 development projects 
with a total cost of 713.09 million SR Dollars. This has made Mali the lowest receiver 
of the Saudi Fund for the countries in our case study. Mali received its highest amount 
from the Saudi Fund for development for the project of the Development of the Senegal 
River Basin (OMVS)135 which costs 196.13 million SR Dollars.  
  
                                                          
135 ‘’The Senegal River is approximately 1800 km long with a basin area of 289000 km square and a mean 
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Projects signed between Saudi Arabia and Senegal (SR million) 
Project Name Amount 
Anambe River Basin (Phase 1) 30 
Development of the Senegal Basin OMVS 237.8 
Kedougou-Saraya Road 24.84 
Sacre-Coeur Housing (Phase 1) 4.14 
Emergency Plan for Potable Water Supply 56.9 
Rural Development in Rural Senegal 10.68 
Dialakoto-Kedougou Roads Technical and Economic Feasibility Study 2.75 
Canal and Road Frone De’ Terre in Dakar 8.41 
Support of Economic Sectors 22 
Social and Economic Sectors Support 8 
Dialakoto-Kedougou Road 39.25 
Anambe River Basin Development (Phase 2) 57.5 
Cap Des Biches Power Station Expansion 78.51 
Development of Education 26.89 
Irrigated Agriculture Development on Senegal River 45 
Development of Health Level 15.59 
Potable Water Supply to Notto-Audiosmone-Palmarin 33.75 
Dalal Jamm Hospital 67.4 
Ouakam Road, in Dakar 114 
Dalal Jamm Hospital (Additional Loan) 34 
Reahabilitation and Extension of Matam Agricultural Project (Phase 2) 74.2 
Medina Gounass-Guinea’s Border Road 37.5 
Rehabilitation of Ourossogui-Bakel Road 6.51 
Total 1035.62 
Source Data: Annual Report of the Saudi Fund For Devopment, 2016 
From the third table above, Senegal has been both the largest receiver of the Saudi Fund 




received a total number of 23 projects costing 1035.62 million SR Dollars from the 
table above. 
In general, the tables above show exactly how much loan the Saudi government has 
given to the three main countries in our case study. This table does not include the 
grants and other humanitarian aid that has been allocated to this countries. This is 
mainly due to Saudi Arabia’s secrecy136  in its aid giving policies and accurate 
information does not exist on the total amount of humanitarian grant that has been 
allocated by KSA. 
2.1.2. Multilateral 
The multilateral Arab aid institutions are the most transparent institutions in terms of aid 
giving compared to the bilateral aids.137 These multilateral agencies were created with 
the aim of using the grants and loans to promote humanitarian assistance and other 
activities effectively and efficiently.138. Most of these agencies provide annual reports 
on their grants and loans’ activities for every country they give assisstance and support 
to accross the globe and they also invest in different sectors such as agricultural, 
transport, energy, education, human and social development, and infrastructural 
sectors.139 The Arab multilateral agencies mentioned in this work includes the Arab 
Gulf Programme For Development (AGFUND), Arab Monetary Fund, Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development, Arab Bank for Development in Africa (BADEA), 
the Islamic Bank for Development (IDB), and the OPEC Fund for International 
Development. 
Arab Gulf Programme For Development 
The Arab Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND) is a regional development 
institution created in 1980 by Prince Talal Ibn Abdelaziz and it is also supported by 
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seven Arab golf leaders (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates), which are members and contributors to its budget.140 The 
Program supports the efforts to achieve sustainable human development targeting the 
most vulnerable groups in developing countries, especially women and children, 
without discrimination of color, gender, creed or political affiliation, and in 
collaboration with development organizations and national associations working in this 
field. Projects funded under this program are in the education, health, training and 
institutional support sectors or organizations working in the field of human 
development.141 About 176 million US Dollars had been disbursed by AGFUND until 
1989.142 
Since its creation in 1980, AGFUND has contributed to the financing and supporting of 
about 1141 projects and programmes in 131 low income and developing countries with 
total amount of 260 million US Dollars.143 As at 2016, about 952 of these projects have 
already been achieved while the remaining 316 projects are still under construction and 
implementation.144 The main target groups of this fund are the needy and vulnerable 
groups of low income and developing countries, most especially, children, women, 
refugees, people with special needs and youths. And its principal vision and objectives 
are to help in sustaining human development particularly women, children, displaced 
people and the alleviation of poverty.  
Arab Monetary Fund 
The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) is a regional Arab financial institution established in 
1976. It began its activities in 1977, bringing together 22 Arab countries and aims to 
establish financial bases for the economic integration of the Arab countries, accelerate 
the process of economic development in the Arab countries and to strengthen trade 
between these countries.145 Its headquarter is in Abu-Dhabi and it mostly gives short 
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and medium term loans to member countries. Actually this agency does not have much 
to do with Sub-Saharan Africa, the main aim of this cooperation is to help in settling the 
disequilibrium in the balance of payment of member countries.146 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) is an Arab regional 
and independent financial institution based in Kuwait. It was created in 1974.147 and it 
comprises 21 Arab countries. The Fund aims to contribute to the financing of economic 
development projects and programmes in the Arab countries through concessional loans 
to agencies and public institutions, giving priority to vital economic projects in the Arab 
world, private sector financing, creation and the management of special funds aimed at 
achieving objectives similar to those of the Fund, encouraging the investment of public 
and private funds in a direct or indirect way, allowing the development of the Arab 
economy and the provision of technical assistance in the various fields of economic 
development.148 
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) 
The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa is a financial institution created in 
1974 by 18 countries of the Arab League to contribute to the development effort in Sub-
Saharan Africa, it is modernizing itself to become the major driving force of the Afro-
Arab partnership.149 Because of its capacity to mobilize multiple partners during the 
development of financial operations, BADEA ensures that its interventions generate a 
real leverage effect for the financial viability of its projects.150 The Bank has thus 
succeeded in forging partnerships with several regional and international donors 
including the World Bank, the African Development Bank and members of the Arab 
Coordinating Group. These partnerships have resulted in several jointly funded projects 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. BADEA intends to strengthen the leverage of its interventions 
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by financing projects developed in the framework of public-private partnerships.151 This 
emerging mode of financing in Sub-Saharan Africa presents several advantages that go 
beyond the reduction of the immediate financial costs incurred by the authorities in a 
context marked by a scarcity of resources. It generally ensures not only better respect of 
the budgets allocated and the deadlines given but also a better sustainability of the 
projects carried out, through the systematic programming of the maintenance that is 
inherent in it.152 BADEA took over the running and management of the Special Arab 
Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA)153 in 1976.154 
The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa for 43 years now, since its 
creation in 1974 has contributed approximately to the financing of more than 631 
developmental projects in Sub-Saharan Africa with a total cost of about 5 billion 
dollars.155  In June, 2016 BADEA allocated an amount of 20 million of dollars loan with 
an interest rate of 1% for some projects in rural development of some areas in Guinea, 
and it also allocated 10 million dollars with an interest rate of 1% to Mali for the 
construction of Kwala-Nara-Mauritania borders road (BADEA 2016: 19). In general, 
BADEA loan to Sub-Saharan Africa for the public sector in 2016 was 210 million 
Dollars.156 
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Sectoral Distribution of BADEA Public loans to Africa for the year 2015 and 2016 
( US million Dollars) 
Sector Number of Projects Amounts  
 2015 2016 2015 2016 
Infrastructure 10 7 112.8 98.5 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
3 4 35.6 59 
Social 5 5 46.6 52.5 
Private (Directed to 
Government) 
1  5  
Total 19 16 200 210 
Source Data: BADEA Annual Report, 2016 
The table above shows the sectorial distribution of the BADEA projects and total costs 
in SSA for the year 2015 and 2016. From the table, we can see that there was a 5% 
increase in the amount from 2015 to 2016, but the total number of projects reduced from 
19 in 2015 to 16 in 2016. the table also shows that the infrastructural sector has been the 
largest receiver for 2015 and 2016, and there was also an increase in the amount 
appropriated to the Agriculture and Rural Development, and the social sector compared 
to the previous year. 
From 1975-2016 BADEA’s total cumulative commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa is 
5,095.883 million dollars, out of which 4,194.206 million dollars were dedicated to 
finance and support 631 development projects. 54.18% of this total loans have been 
ascertained to the sector of infrastructure, 23.83% to the sector of agriculture and rural 
development, 1.23% to industry, 10.19% to social sector, 6.15% to private, and 0.3% as 
urgent aid (BADEA 2016: 22).157 
In regards to the vital role that BADEA has played in the economic and social 
development of Africa, it has also encouraged, promoted, and made ease trade exchange 
between African and Arab countries. This supports one of our main determinants of 
Arab aid to SSA which emphasizes that Arab aid donors pursue commercial interests in 
                                                          




their aid giving policies. This is done most especially through trade exchange between 
Arab and African countries. In order to promote and facilitate these free and easy 
movement of capital and goods, BADEA contributed 10 million dollars in capital of 
(AFRIEXIMBANK)158, the African Export-Import Bank. And according to BADEA 
annual report of 2016, it also contributed 100 million dollars to finance Arab Exports to 
African countries.159 
Islamic Development Bank 
The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was established in April 1975 and began its 
activities in October 1975. Its purpose is to promote the socio-economic development 
and social progress of the member countries and in Muslim societies in accordance with 
the principles of Islamic law (IDB 2013: 1)160. IDB members now reach 56 countries, 
which are also members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.161 The IDB 
undertakes its activities through the allocation of loans for the financing of 
infrastructural projects, technical assistance for the preparation of feasibility studies, 
contribution to the financing of bankable projects and the capital of national financial 
institutions.162 
In 2015, IDB approved 20 operations totalling 1.1 billion US Dollars in 12 member 
countries of which Guinea and Senegal were among163. 
The African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank signed a landmark 
agreement on the 11th of july, 2017 that will strengthen their partnership and 
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cooperation for the development of Africa.164 The two parties agreed to raise 2 billion 
dollars over the next three years to finance projects in the areas of agriculture,  food 
security, renewable energy, small and medium-sized business and human development 
in the sector of health and education.  To achieve this goal, the AFDB and the IDB will 
each need to provide 1 billion dollars over the next three years. With this agreement, the 
IDB is also committed to working with the AFDB to achieve the Five Top Priorities 
(Top 5) that the Bank has set itself, to accelerate Africa's economic transformation.165 
The IDB is one of the largest contributors to the African Development Bank in terms of 
co-financing. The two banks co-financed together more than 2,5 billion dollars worth of 
projects over the period from 2002 to 2016. The AFDB has an office in 21 of the 27 
countries that are both members of the IDB and the AFDB. As part of this new 
agreement, the Bank and the IDB will build on synergies, and thus exploit each other 
the complementarities and expertise of their respective teams based in these different 
countries.166 
It should not be forgotten that before the signing of the aforementioned agreement 
between the two financial institution,  the board of the Islamic Development Bank also 
approved 383,8 million dollars in funding three energy projects in Africa on the 4th of 
July, 2017. Burkina Faso will thus receive 102.8 million dollars for the construction of 
the Kossodo thermal power plant, with a capacity of 50 MW in Ouagadougou. 165.4 
million dollars was allocated to Mali for the construction of the 100 MW Sirakoro 
thermal power plant. Finally, Egypt will soon receive 115.6 million dollars for the 
implementation of two solar power plant projects with a total capacity of 550 MW, 
including the planned construction of a 400 MW solar power plant by Scatec Solar.167 
The Islamic Development Bank also granted Senegal an amount of 132.2 billion Franc 
CFA approximately 201.2 million euros in Febuary, 2016 to finance a major urban 
water project near Lake Guiers and the groundnut campaign programme that is in 
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progress168. The IDB has also pledged to finance 1.3 billion euros of Senegalese 
infrastructure by 2020. Also another  87.2 billion Franc CFA will be allocated for the 
partial financing of the urban water project, Keur Momar-Sarr 3, which was among the 
announcements of infrastructural programmes of the Senegalese President Macky Sall, 
during his New Year message in December, 2015. The new water treatment unit, 
located in Keur Momar Sarr, in the region of Louga (north-west) aims to supply 
drinking water to the city of Dakar. It will have a processing capacity of 200,000 cubic 
meters per day. Macky Sall also announced the construction of a seawater desalination 
plant, built in the district of Mamelles, in the region of Dakar. These two infrastructures 
with a total cost of 390 billion Franc CFA  (600 million euros) must contribute to 
securing the supply of drinking and potable water to the capital for at least 20 years 
according to the speech made by the Senegalese President in December. (Jeune Afrique 
2017). This IDB developmental project will also contribute to the extension of the 
distribution network around the new economic hubs of Dakar, Thiès and the localities 
crossed by the Lac Guiers pipeline (in northwestern Senegal, which provides 30% of the 
water consumed in the Dakar region).169 
Another example of the Islamic Development Bank charity and humanitarian assistance 
is the WAQF BID170 which is an educational charitable institution. Its main aim is to 
provide assistance to needy students in Guinea. This assistance may include 
postgraduate scholarships in Guinea or abroad. The WAQF has also intended to support 
the Islamic Educational Institutions in Guinea, to support, develop and finance the 
Islamic orphanages in Guinea with the aim of improving the educational system through 
the building of schools of all kinds(WAQF BID 2015). Last year this WAQFBID signed 
a contract of 45 million dollars with the Guinean government for the contstruction of a 
real estate complex, WAQF City, which will undoubtedly enable the WAQFBID 
Guinea to increase its actions for the benefit of the education sector, the youth and the 
underprivileged sector, and also to extend them to the health sector in particular and to 
all other social sector in general. 
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The OPEC Fund for International Development 
The OPEC Fund for International Development is a multilateral financing institution, 
including OPEC member countries, which was established in August 1976 to 
consolidate South-South relations and promote cooperation between its members and 
other developing countries through the mobilization of resources necessary for the 
socio-economic development of these countries, as well as for the international 
institutions that intervene in the developing countries (OFID 1980)171.  
The OFID supports the socio-economic progress of low-income countries. In order to 
accomlish its mission, it grants loans on favorable terms for helping in financing 
development programmes and projects, as well as donations for technical assistance, 
food aid, research and relief emergency. It also contributes to the resources of other 
developing countries (eg IFAD and the PRGF Trust Fund). Its resources come from 
voluntary contributions contributed by the member countries and accumulated reserves 
over the years of operations. At the close of the fiscal year of 2005, the country 
members contribution totaled 3,435 million dollars, of which 2,455 million dollars was 
directly contributed to the OPEC Fund. The reserve account amounted to 2,470 millions 
of USD.172 
In 2005, the total loan of the OPEC Fund for International development in Africa was 
149.11 million dollars which amounted to a rate of 52% of the total loan allocated to the 
world by the organization and about 16 African countries benefited from this loan 
during this period.173 Of this total loan allocated to Africa in 2005, Mali received 3.5% 
of the OPEC Fund, which totalled approximately 10 million dollars. Africa share of the 
total loan dropped to 48% in 2016, but the number of countries that benefited increased 
to 32. 
In 2016, Guinea attracted 20 million dollars from the OPEC Fund which was invested in 
the Agricultural sector, Mali received 10.40 million dollars in the transport sector, while 
                                                          
171 OFID, “The Agreement Establishing the OPEC Fund for International Development,” 
(1980) as revised on May 27, 1980 accessed at www.opecfund.org/publications/PDF/AE-
engl_Fund.pdf   
 
172 OFID, Annual Report, 2006. 




Senegal received 15 million dollars that was also allocated to the sector of 
Agriculture.174 In total Guinea has received a loan of 134.44 million dollars as at 
October, 2017, of this loans about 53.45 million dollars was ascertained to the 
agricultural sector.175 
2.2. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sub-Saharan Africa, also called Black Africa because it is mainly populated by 
individuals with the black skin, this name is given to this region in order to make a 
difference with the Northen part of Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is generally subdivided 
into four sub-regions known as West Africa, East, South and Central Africa. Sub 
Saharan Africa is made up of 48 countries (including the islands of Cape Verde and Sao 
Tome and Principle) and populated by about 1 billion inhabitants (as the beginning of 
the 21st century)176, sub-Saharan Africa is the most deprived part of the continent, 
especially in economic matters, and the most politically unstable with a very low per 
capita GDP of  (about 1000 dollars/year).177 Academicians and politicians of different 
political convinctions have tried to divide Africa into two principal and unrelated parts: 
the first is, arabic178 and Islamic, and the second is, Black Africa179 which is composed 
of different racial and ethnic groups with various Islamic, Christain and Traditional 
believes180. 
The Magreb and countries of the Nile are geographically situated in the Africa 
Continent, this has provided a tangible link and basis of co-operation between the Arab 
World and Africa.181 Although, no state in Black Africa (SSA) has regarded itself as an 
Islamic State like some of the countries of Maghreb and Middle East, but SSA can be 
regarded as one of the majör Islamic theatres of the World.182 
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Islam’s first contact with Africa was with Ethiopia. The Prophet Muhammad advised 
his followers to immigrate to Ethiopia to avoid persecution in Mecca, in the very early 
days of Islam, his followers were well received and protected by the Emperor in spite of 
strong representation by their adversaries.183 
The Trans-Saharan Trade is also a majör and important activity that promoted the Afro-
Arab relations, it refers to the trade accross the Sahara desert between the Mediterranean 
countries and Sub-Saharan Africa.184 
 
Historic Trans-Saharan Trade Routes, 8th to 19th centuries 
Source: http://ericrossacademic.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/historic-routes.jpg 
Colonial etnohraphic templates reinforced perceptions about the Sahara as a natural 
boundary between the North and the rest of Africa, separating White and Black Africa 
and by extension Arabs and Berbers from Africans185. 
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF 
COUNTRIES CASES 
Before we analyze how the Arab-aid has influenced the spread of Wahabism and the 
radicalization of the young African population, we would like to give a brief history of 
the spread of Islam in SSA.  
We can distinguish four stages in the history of the penetration of Islam in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The first contacts date back to the 8th century: Islam spreads slowly and 
peacefully by the Arab-Berber traders who crisscross the Sudan-Sahelian zone. At the 
turn of the 10th century, the time of the first Muslim empires like that of Ghana began, 
which was also the time when Islam organizes political life in the region186. According 
to Jean-Louis Triaud,187 a specialist of Muslim societies in Sub-saharan Africa, Islam 
was known as the religion of the dynasties, traders in the cities, but not yet that of the 
population. In the 17th century a more warlike Islam appeared, first in Mauritania, 
Senegal and Guinea, then more massively in northern Nigeria, where the movement 
culminated with the founding of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1804. This period is marked by 
the establishment of Islamic states that impose on people the practice of a rigorous 
Islam as stated by Jean-Louis Triaud.188 
Muslims then were essentially of Sunni Islam which has the majority of the Muslim 
poulation today, In West Africa, Islam is marked by the influence of various 
brotherhoods - associations of disciples following a spiritual path under the teaching of 
a master, which is known as the Sheikh in the doctrine of Sufism. The Shiite branch 
(minority movement, mainly present in Iran) remains very little visible but is 
represented, particularly in Nigeria. Contrary to what we can read often, there is no 
specifically African Islam, argues Jean-Louis Triaud (1973).  
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There is a multitude of Muslim brotherhoods in Africa, but three major ones can be 
distinguished. The Khadiriya is the oldest: founded in Iraq by Sheikh Abdul-Khadire 
Djilani (1077-1166), it is mainly present in Mauritania and Senegal. The first president 
of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Mokhtar Ould-Daddah, was born into a large 
marabout family, a follower of the Khadiriya. This form of the brotherhood advocates a 
rather traditional Islam, says Jean-Louis Triaud (1973). 
The Tidjaniya is a Sufi brotherhood founded by Sheikh Ahmad Al Tidjani (1737-1815), 
an Algerian who claimed to have met the Prophet in the waking state, which gives him 
greater legitimacy. It is present from Senegal to Sudan. His most famous disciple is the 
conqueror toucouleur El Hadj Omar Tall (1794-1864). In Senegal, the Tidjanes 
represent more than half of the Muslims. They consider themselves as more intellectual 
and cultivated, adds Jean-Louis Triaud (1973). 
Finally, the Mouride brotherhood was founded by a former follower of the Khadiriya, 
Ahmadou Bamba M'Backé (died in 1927). This Senegalese brotherhood is mainly 
addressed to the Wolofs, the most important ethnic group in the country. Ahmadou 
Bamba, whose face was heroized after a long deportation by the French, had made 
manual work a pious activity in the same way as prayer. The center of the confraternity 
is the city of Touba: every year there is an important pilgrimage. The former president 
of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, is mouride.189 Senegal’s brotherhood also became strong 
pillars for the governing authorities.190 
After independence in the early 1960s, African Islam moved closer to the Arab-Muslim 
world. As early as 1969, dozens of African states participated in the creation of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Gulf monarchies, primarily Saudi Arabia, 
participated in this rapprochement by financing the construction of many schools, 
mosques, Islamic cultural centers. They also distributed scholarships to train students in 
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the Middle East. Multidimensional exchanges that finally Arabized African Islam, with 
SSA countries like Cameroun becoming a full member of OIC in 1974.191 
The Wahhabis, in power in Saudi Arabia, adopt a position very hostile to brotherhoods, 
considered by them as reprehensible innovations.192 In recent years, there has been a 
strengthening of their presence in the public space. They intervene in particular on all 
questions related to the family code, says Jean-Louis Triaud. It is on their periphery that 
more extreme militants, still very few in number, can emerge, claiming both Salafism, 
al-Qaida, and Boko Haram. 
This shift of the Sub-saharan African Muslims toward the Arab nation was supported 
mainly by the oil boom of the Gulf countries. The Arab nations, most especially, Saudi 
Arabia was able to finance its Wahhabist doctrine mainly through financial assistance 
and humanitarian aid.193 People were largely influenced by the Wahhabi trained 
preachers, which are direct product of one of the activities of Saudi aid. This change led 
to many chaos in the region. We will start by analyzing a case that occured in Guinea in 
2015, where two brothers tried to build a Mosque that was contrary to the teachings of 
Sufism in Touba, Guinea. 
3.1. Guinea 
Indeed, since the 1970s, we have witnessed a vast worldwide movement of re-
Islamization, led by conservative currents: Wahhabi salafism from Saudi Arabia, and 
the Muslim Brotherhood movement born in Egypt at the end of the 1920s. Although 
both currents have fundamental differences between them, they nevertheless find 
themselves in their rejection of Western values and civilizational evolution, and they are 
both hostile to individual liberties such as the freedom of expression and freedom of 
conscience194. Wahhabism, has become a growing ideology in the Muslim world, 
especially thanks to oil Money and other factors.195 
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3.1.1. Case 1: The Second Mosque Issue of Touba 
I will like to emphasize that most of the cases are being taking from Guinean, Malian 
and Senegalese online newspapers and journals. A link will be provided in the footnotes 
for every cases used in this work. Some cases are also based on personal experience, 
which motivated me to write on this. 
Touba is a village in Guinea located in the Boké region, in the north-west of the 
country. It is a hotbed of Islam in West Africa. The inhabitants of Touba are Sunni 
Muslims. Touba being a cradle of Sufism, their tariqa is the Qadiriyya of Moulay Abd 
al Qadir al-Jilani. Imam Salim being the first Wali of Touba, his Silsila (supreme 
lineage) goes back directly to Muhammad via Ali ibn Abi Talib and Abd al Qadir al-
Jilani196. 
The Emirate of Touba, is a religious and cultural center, founded in 1815 by Imam Al-
Hajj Sheikh Salim Ibn Muhammad Fatim Al Jabir Al Qadir, more commonly known as 
"Karamokho Ba, Grand Master. Imam Salim is a descendant of the family of the 
prophet of Islam Muhammad through Hazrat Omar ibn al-Khattab, who was a cousin of 
the fourth generation prophet. According to Sunni tradition and in some Shiite 
traditions, the Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab is a member of the Prophet's family by his 
covenants with the latter (Muhammad married Hafsa Ibn Omar, Omar married Umm 
Khulthum daughter of Ali ibn Abi Talib). His descendants succeed hereditarily at the 
head of the Zawiyya of Toussa197. 
The problem commenced when two brothers from the family of Touraya wanted to 
build a second Mosque in the city of Touba that is widely known in Guinea as the 
religious and cultural center of Sufism in the country198. The construction of the Mosque 
was automatically opposed by the family of Karambaya, whose major argument was 
that the contruction of the Mosque will bring differences in the practice of religion, 
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which will ultimately led to the division of the town to two different groups belonging 
to two distinguished sects of Islam199.  
In 2015, less than two weeks before the rituals of the grand Fidaou, which is a kind of 
ritual often celebrated in Touba that was scheduled for Friday, November 13, hostilities 
resumed in the sub-prefecture of Touba, between families of Karambaya and Touraya, 
still around the resumption of the construction work of the second Mosque of the holy 
city of Karamoko Salim Diaby. According to local news journals, on Tuesday, October 
27, 2015, at 8.39 am UTC, the Karambayaka (Karamokoba family), mostly women and 
youth, were strongly mobilized, chanting slogans hostile to the Minister of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralization, General Bouréma Condé, who, for them, refuses 
to take a decision to demolish the site of the second Mosque under construction in 
Touba. 
This compact crowd, led by El Hadj N'famady Diaby, Kassoumanma Diaby, El Hadj 
Ntaye Diaby and Sety Diaby, attempted to land in the Santoba sector with the aim of 
demolishing the Mosque construction site, whose Work resumed Sunday, October 25, 
2015, the absence of security forces, who camped on the site, while they were called 
elsewhere for other services. 
Thus, the unbridled crowd was stopped by a unit of service of some security gaurds that 
maintain law and order in that region, stationed between the two hotspots of the Holy 
city. 
Unhappy with the situation and the lack of the government to take immediate action to 
demolish the second Mosque, the angry crowd attacked police forces causing significant 
physical and material damage. As a result, 5 seriously wounded policemen were 
immediately hospitalized at the Gaoual Prefectural Hospital, a building belonging to a 
citizen of the Touraya family was vandalized and burnt down, and 2 law enforcement 
vehicles belonging to the government were also stoned and vandalized 
                                                          
199 This case was taken from Guinee7, ‘’Touba/Deux familles s’entre-déchirent autour de la construction 
d’une Mosquée,’’ Guinee7.com, October 28, 2015.  http://guinee7.com/2015/10/29/toubadeux-






The aforementioned leaders appealed to the Great Mosque of Touba, asking the youth to 
barricade all the local issues. The sub-prefect which is the local government chairman of 
that region, the principal of the College, and the representatives of the State 
Administration were all on the run with their family, because they were targeted by the 
crowd. 
Relating to our case studies of Guinea, a reporter was a witness in November, 2015 
during the tensions, he was able to obtain two contradictory acts of the General 
Secretariat of Religious Affairs. One under the signature of the Deputy Secretary 
General authorizing the construction of the second Mosque and the other under the 
signature of the Secretary General, prohibiting it. The reporter came back with a video 
widely shared on phones in Touba, a video that shows a scene of unheard violence200. 
During his stay in the sub-prefecture of Touba, the reporter extended his microphone to 
some citizens who spoke out about the violence that occurred in this sub-prefecture and 
which resulted in the death of two people and caused significant damage both 
psychological and material. The interviews include the following: 
Karamba Diaby, carpenter: “I was surprised by the magnitude of the events that 
occurred on Sunday 15 and Monday 16 November. What surprised me the most is the 
fact that blood is poured into this religious city. This is the first time and I hope it will 
be the last time. I pray to the Almighty that peace return here’’ 
Talibé Samaoura, residing in Woundoubouré, in Gaoual: “We are used to coming to 
Fidao every two years. When this ceremony ended, I decided to stay a few days. But, in 
the afternoon of Sunday, November 15, while I continued to do my business, I heard 
cries and everyone started to flee. There were throwing stones and clashes, which 
surprised everyone. Some were not happy with the way this religious holiday happened. 
Which, in my opinion, caused all this problem. Of course, there is also the case of the 
mosque. But, I emphasize especially on the fact that there is the case of the death of a 
                                                          
200 See Mohamed DIALLO, ‘’Affaire de Touba : Les deux actes contradictoires du secrétariat général des 
affaires religieuses et cette vidéo qui fait peur (attention, âmes sensibles s’abstenir !),’’ Guinee7.com, 
November 25, 2015. http://guinee7.com/2015/11/30/affaire-de-touba-les-deux-actes-contradictoires-
du-secretariat-general-des-affaires-religieuses-et-cette-video-qui-fait-peur-attention-ames-sensibles-





man. It is not normal. And then the police did not play their role. Instead of protecting 
people, they started to steal. I pray that peace will return to this city’’ 
Rouguiatou Diallo, dressmaker: “What is serious about this problem is the fact that 
there has been the death of a man and arrests of innocent people who are still in prison. 
The state did not play its role. I heard about the problem for more than three years. The 
security forces must remain here for the moment, because it is not resolved” 
Abdoulaye Samoura, teacher: “What happened is scary. When people are barbarously 
killed in a holy city, it is sobering. The construction of a Mosque must not be disputed. I 
think the problem is deeper. And it's up to the state to take responsibility” 
From the start of the construction works to its demolition, this mosque has caused 
enormous material damage, bodily injury and loss of life in the holy city of Touba. As at 
2016, 52 people were arrested in Touba and sent to Gaoual. Several have been released, 
but there are still about 37 people still held in prison in arduous conditions. But, the 
worst thing is that they are being tortured there, said Elhadj Aly Diaby of the 
Karambaya family. 
Elhadj Aly Diaby, who claims to be the holder of the Touba detainees' file, denounces 
the way in which his cohabitants are mistreated at Gaoual. According to him, there was 
a child named Mamadou Ciré whose arm was broken. His father Elhadj Seydi went to 
visit Gaoual, he was also arrested and put in prison. In addition, there is another young 
person who came from France just to attend Fidaou, he was arrested and put in a prison. 
He had just a three month stay that has already expired.  
Currently, a Karambaya delegation from the “Benkato” association, headed by Elhadj 
N'famady Diaby, spokesman for the Khalif general, is in Conakry to meet, it is said, the 
secretary general for religious affairs, the minister of the Administration of the Territory 
and Decentralization and possibly the Head of State, to discuss the problem of detainees 
and especially to obtain a final decision from the government on the case of the mosque 
in question in Touba. 
It should be remembered that it is the family of Touraya who wanted to build this 
mosque in their locality since 2014. But, according to their brothers of Karambaya, the 




Touba is not consenting. Thus, the family Touraya, through one of his sons Elhadj 
Mamadou Dienkembadi, pushed the pawns to have a wall of at least two meters high. 
With the strong opposition of the Karambaya family, the foundation was demolished on 
Sunday, November 15, 2015. This statement contradicts the fact that the main causes of 
the opposition of the other family was the fear of Wahhabism taking over the region of 
Touba. 
After a long time work stoppage, it was informed that the construction of the Mosque 
demolished in November 2015, resumed its normal course and is at a very advanced 
level. It was Elhadj Mamadou Diaby, a scholar from the Touraya family, who 
confirmed the news on a phone call to a local journal on Wednesday, June 8, 2016. “We 
have resumed the construction work of our mosque. And, besides, we are ahead, we are 
at the level of the slab. Let the liars lie there and we are on our truth. We are strong in 
the truth because we are on the way of God”  said Elhadj Mamadou Diaby.  
Regarding the movement of women who have protested for 4 days against the 
resumption of the construction of the second mosque, this scholar from Touraya retorts: 
‘’Yes! There are women demonstrating by preventing even the holding of the market, 
but they can do it only at home there, no one dares to arrive here in Touraya. The 
authorities follow the work under the magnifying glass. The police come every day to 
monitor and supervise the work’’.  
According to Elhadj Mamadou Diaby, a scholar from Touraya, the spokesman for the 
founding family of this second mosque, who spoke on the phone with the correspondent 
of local journal in Boké, on Thursday, July 13, 2017, the yard evolves wonderfully and 
tends even towards its finish. “We are at the final stage” We just have to put the tiles, he 
happily announced. 
According to Elhadj Mamadou Diaby, the citizens of Touraya have already begun to 
pray in this mosque since the previous day of Ramadan and the place is secured by 
groups of gendarmes who take turns to monitor the site. It is in this mosque that we pray 
since the day before Ramadan. We just have to put the tiles, all the doors are closed and 




In regards to whether the families of Touraya and Karambaya finally found a common 
ground for the realization of this Mosque, Elhadj Mamadou cut it short: “they (those of 
Karambaya) have abandoned the problem because they are tired. They are ashamed. 
They understood that they will never stop us from building a house of God. We will 
never understand each other again with these people. Moreover, to secure the site, 
security agents are deployed here. A team comes for a time; and, after her, another 
comes to take over’’ said to a local news by the sage of Touraya, Elhadj Mamadou 
Diaby. 
In the light of the foregoing, there is every reason to believe that despite the current 
calm, the Touba conflict is far from over. However, the authorities would have done 
better to find a definitive solution by reconciling the brothers Karambaya and Touraya 
who constitute the same big family. 
It should be remembered that this project to build the second Touba Mosque between 
the Karambaya and Touraya brothers caused bloodshed. Two young people of the 
Karambaya family: Mukhtar Diaby and Dialinka Diaby, lost their lives in this conflict. 
Significant property damages were recorded, multi-storey buildings were looted, several 
wounded and dozens more were arrested and imprisoned in Gaoual and the Boké civil 
prison. 
Karambaya's family, opposed to the construction of a mosque in Touraya, reproached 
their brothers for not respecting the organizational procedure of submitting their project 
to the Khalif General of Touba and waiting for him to order its realization with the 
agreement of all. That is, there is an internal agreement before going to the 
administrative authorities. 
For its part, the family of Touraya accuses those of Karambaya to have violated them in 
some of their rights and to take themselves above everyone. What they consider 
unacceptable and decide to no longer admit it. 
This aforementioned case of the construction of the second Touba Mosque is a very 




Mosque and start preaching a doctrine that is contradictory to the existing one201. The 
issue would have certainly led to more lost of lives and damages if not for the heavy 
intervention of the security forces of the country. This case also serve as a clear example 
of the impact of Saudi and Arab aid in general, though, no account was provided for the 
finance of the Mosque, but it is widely known that the sages behind this issue are 
Wahhabi trained preachers. It is likely that some of them from this region have been 
beneficiaries of Saudi scholarships. 
3.1.2. Case 2: The Case of Labe 
A quarrel also broke out in Labé202 last year. The former capital of the defunct 
theocratic kingdom of Fouta-Djalon, in Guinea, is the scene of a silent struggle of 
religious influences, "arms dangling" against "arms crossed". The first, Malikite 
Muslims praying with their arms at their sides that are gathered in the Sufi brotherhood 
of the Tijana. For some years now, however, this old order has been wavering under the 
assault of a competitor hunting on Islamic lands and from Chad to Guinea, prospering in 
the subregion: Wahhabism, whose followers pray with arms crossed203. 
They are several hundred men, kneeling on their prayer rug outside the Tata 1 mosque, 
not far from the center of Labe. Inside, the prayer rooms are already crowded. The 
women, most of them dressed in the black niqab, took their place in the classrooms of 
the adjoining Franco-Arab Quranic school which, on other days, accommodates nearly 
300 pupils. 
Not so long ago, however, there was hardly anyone in Tata 1. It was not until 2016 that 
the Wahhabi mosque was allowed to conduct a Friday prayer.  
                                                          
201 The people of Touba believe the second Mosque wanted to be constructed by people who are more 
familiar with the Wahhabi doctrine. Though, no source started that the Mosque was financed by the 
Arabs, but people in Touba widely believe the people behind the construction are Wahhabi trained, 
which is a product of the Saudi humanitarian assistance. 
202 Labé is the main city and administrative capital of the Fouta Djallon region of Guinea. It has a 
population of about 200.000. Labé is situated some 450 km northeast of Conakry close to the 
geographic centre of Guinea. 
203 This case was taken from a report by Christophe CHATELOT, ‘’En Guinée, la percée wahhabite 
bouleverse les équilibres religieux,’’ Le Monde Afrique, September 22, 2017 
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The construction of the Tata 1 mosque in the early 2000s was financed by an Islamic 
association in Kuwait, via a Guinean association, said his imam, Ibrahim Khalil Diallo, 
from a Tidjane family but converted to Wahhabism during his studies in Egypt. We will 
not know more about the funding he said. Including bypassing the traditional right of 
scrutiny of the Islamic League controlled by the Tidjanes, we start by building a reading 
room or a Franco-Arab school. Then, on the same plot, a Mosque is erected, he 
explains. Without asking the permission of the League, which would refuse us. The 
Tidjanes arrived first at Fouta-Djalon, we are still in the minority, but it will not last, 
promises the imam, people join us. 
This is notably the case on the outskirts of Labé, in the Dombi sector of the Daka 
district. There, the rural exodus feeds a wild urbanization made of hovels often without 
water and electricity. There is no public school in the neighborhood. Many families then 
turn to the French-Arab schools of the Wahhabis, says Alpha Mamadou Ceilou Diallo, 
pointing to the buildings located across the street in the earth smashed by the first rains 
of the season. While recognizing the indigence of public education, this French teacher 
in a private school worries about the future of these children trained in a culture of 
mediocrity. In Conakry, a senior official of the Ministry of Education admits that his 
ministry has no idea of the education provided in the Franco-Arab schools that flourish 
throughout the country. 
The phenomenon began in the 1990s with the arrival of Guineans from the diaspora 
previously established in Mauritania, Senegal and Mali. In recent years, it has taken on 
new dimensions and creates tensions. Young religious leaders, returning from Arab 
schools and universities where they learned the language and boast of a clearer 
understanding of the translation of the Qur'an, created a generational conflict with 
scholars who had so far had a basic knowledge of the text. They came back to impose 
their vision, says Thierno Boubacar, a scholar and respected member of the Regional 
League of Religious Affairs. 
At the top of the city, the leader of the Tidjanes embodies this old generation. Until 
recently, the family of Al-Hadj Badourou Bah reigned supreme over the city. Attests to 
his huge villa not far from the great mosque of which he is the Imam. His brother is the 




himself admits to having neglected the Quranic hearths, leaving the field open to the 
supporters of the new science.  
Wahhabism attracts people because it upsets the social order, says Alimou Barry, a 
member of a conflict prevention group, who tried to mediate between Tijaniya and 
Wahhabi. Here in Fouta-Djalon, he explains, survives a caste system within the Fulani 
community that you can hardly escape. The new science offers them this possibility by 
welcoming them into a more egalitarian community. In the Tidjanes, only the nobles 
direct the prayers. According to Barry Kalidou, It is a form of return to religious 
sources, a current perceived as a reformer. They do not adapt to local cultures and play 
on a form of identity withdrawal.  
For Al-Hadj Badourou Bah, it is a threat to the stability of its city, and the country more 
generally. They abuse the credulity of poor and illiterate people. This has an impact on 
the traditional social order, because they involve family traditions such as wedding 
ceremonies or burial, warns the imam. 
The Wahhabi mosque of Tata 1, after the provisional release of the two accused, a 
group of young people attacked the Quranic school which also served as a place of 
prayer for the complainant, reports an observer from a local news who experienced the 
incident around 7.30 pm in Donghol, in the town of Labé. 
To prevent, it is said, the Wahhabiyah after organizing Friday prayers, the private 
building was disheveled, the doors smashed, the prayer mats burned, a piece of furniture 
fell. The demonstrators met no resistance204. They destroyed the building without 
difficulty. This Qur’anic school was closed at the time of the attack. Apparently, the 
owner was away from the scene and no security guard came on the news. 
A conflict between two Islamic sects: the Tidjaniya and the Sunnis or Wahhabis also 
happened in Labe in 2015. To understand the reasons, a reporter for a local journal met 
the spokesperson of the Wahhabites, Outaz Mamadou Diouldé Barry, his friend 
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Abdoulaye Cissé, director of the Franco-Arab primary school of Tata 1 and the Grand 
Imam of Labé, Elhadj Thierno Badrou Bah.205 
Mamadou Diouldé Barry Darou-Nyla: it is more than 15 years since these different 
mosques were built. Since then, we are in dialogue to know how we can open them. 
But, since the time of Elhadj Abdourahmane Bah, and today his successor who is his 
son, Elhadj Badrou Bah, head of the Islamic League of Labe, we fail. There has been 
enough talk, but it still does not work and we still do not understand why. 
On the resumption of the conflict after a period of lull, Mamadou Diouldé Barry 
explains: Indeed, we had gone to Conakry to meet the secretariat for religious affairs 
and the Presidency of the Republic to find a solution. The president sent a delegation to 
Labé headed by the great Imam, Elhadj Mamadou Saliou Camara and General 
Boureima Condé. After their return to Conakry, the Islamic League invited us again to 
the dialogue we made in two meetings. After all, we understand that the regional 
Islamic league does not want the opening of these mosques. Among those who refuse 
this opening, figure, Elhadj Badrou Bah and his brother Elhadj Safioulaye Bah. Elhadj 
Safioulaye even said that this mosque in which we are here for this interview is not 
conducive for a Friday prayer, but a mosque where children can learn to pray. We 
thought that was unacceptable. Not wanting to create a problem in the country, we 
decided to calm down first. But, some time later, we decided to resume praying because 
prayer belongs to God, not to a human. 
Returning to their refusal to go to pray at the other mosques approved by the Islamic 
League, the spokesman, Mamadou Diouldé Barry, said: We pray in these mosques, but 
what you understand, there have been enough things that happened. Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH) said that there will come a time when Muslims will divide into 73 
sects, where each will have choices that the other does not want. Before, we all prayed 
together, but since we could not accept the ‘’Tijanaanism‘’ they did not even give us a 
place. Those who had it were removed. We have more than ten (10) imams who have 
been relieved of their duties in the different mosques. Wherever we talk about a 
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mosque, they say that whoever crosses their arms will not have room. Now, if you do 
not like a problem and since it's common, that's a problem, you're going to turn around 
too. Otherwise, all over the country, we find the Imams of all the edges, except in Labé 
where it is the unique thought. If you do not do what they say, they are problems, he 
says. 
The country only needs peace, nothing else. That's why we pulled out to meet in our 
mosques, but with that too they refuse us. Currently, we have about ten (10) mosques in 
the city. As they refused us the opening of some mosques, those among us who have the 
means left to build mosques in their homes. We pray in these mosques until this last 
time. Recently, Governor Sadou Keita summoned us to say that until now the regional 
league does not authorize us to open the mosques, since he had read on the net that 
clashes could take place on the Friday following our meeting. 
Finally, Mamadou Diouldé Barry urges the leaders of the country to assume their 
responsibilities: I ask every official of this country to look at what the law says to 
understand that Guinea is a secular country where everyone is free in his belief. We ask 
the regional league to pay attention and not all of them are Elhadj Badrou Bah and his 
brother. They must know that what is everywhere in Guinea cannot be in Labé, he 
concludes. 
A religious leader in Labe named Abubakr was also arrested in 2015 by the regional 
authorities, according to Africaguinee (2015)206. A reporter indicates that Abubakr is 
from the Wahhabi brotherhood belonging to the association ‘’Ahloul Sounna wal 
diama'a’’. 
Detained at the CMIS Safatou, he is accused of having made comments about Jihad, but 
especially for having said he was in contact with Islamists in northern Mali. He was 
quoted as saying at a meeting that Governor Sadou Keita organized on 19 February 
2015 between the Wahhabis and the regional Islamic league.  He is being prosecuted for 
his remarks about the arrival of someone to start the jihad in Labe, said Aboubacar Biro 
Keita, Regional Director of the Sûreté de Labe, at the microphone of the reporter. 
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Labe, as stated before is a city strongly inked in the Tidjane faith. But lately, 
Wahhabism is experiencing a meteoric rise in the country. But in Labe, this brotherhood 
struggles to impose itself. The opening of their mosque has always been prevented. 
What prompted the followers of this sect to proceed to the inauguration of its mosque in 
hiding. But it was closed soon by the governor on February 19, 2015. That same day, 
Mr. Sadou Keita organized a meeting with the various religious of the city to find a 
happy ending to this situation. 
According to the reporter, at this meeting, Abubakr, very up against the closure of his 
mosque, had suddenly dropped: We will do the forcing from now, because they want to 
block us without valid argument, the authorities are complicit of this situation. So we 
will obey no one. Religion, we practice it as we want. The authorities are not honest. 
They failed in their mission. If it's the instability or the war we wanted in Labe, we 
would have done it a long time ago. Jihadists came to contact us, but we rejected them. 
We did this because we want peace. 
This case of Labe in Guinea also shows a clear example of the impact of the spread of 
Wahhabism. Though, according to this case it is not the Wahhabists who started the 
problems, with the exception of the case of the Imam who encouraged Jihad in Labe, 
but Tidjanes are just worried about this spread.  
This case study also supported other socio-economic factors listed in our diagram that 
contributes to the radicalization of youth. The case mentioned that due to lack of 
schools in some areas in Labe, the children are forced to attend Quranic schools built by 
the Wahhabists.  
3.1.3. Case 3: The Case of Dinguiraye 
A group of young people demonstrated on Friday, June 26, 2015, in the prefecture of 
Dinguiraye, located 512 km from Conakry, calling for the release of a certain Idrissa 
Bah saying a presumed ‘’Sunni’’, who came to Islamize the population of Dinguiraye 
who, according to him, practices the ‘’Tidjane’’ as religion207. 
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According to an official source, when Idrissa Bah came to Dinguiraye, he began by 
teaching the Holy Quran to some followers to better integrate. This is how he managed 
to bring together 115 women, 160 children and 50 men. Satisfied with the number of 
adherents, the man also asked for a parcel in order to build a Quranic School and a 
Mosque for ‘’Sunnis’’ practitioners. But from identical sources, Idrissa Bah claims to be 
a victim of the persecutions of people who asked his landlord to send him away with his 
entire group. 
According to a local journal, in order to obtain funding from certain institutions, Idrissa 
Bah wrote a letter in Arabic that he has placed in his Qur'an. Shortly after, one of his 
friends borrows his Qur’an for reading. While going through the Qu’ran, the latter 
observed the letter and wished to read carefully. Suddenly, Idrissa threw himself on the 
friend to recover the letter, which had already fallen into the hands of others.  
Feeling bullied, the other side complained to Justice against Idrissa Bah who attacked 
the entire population of Dinguiraye saying that the ‘’Tidjane’’ practiced in Dinguiraye 
for ages, does not seem to be better than the ‘’Sunna’’, the best religion, as it was 
explained. When the investigating judge put Idrissa under a warrant, his supporters 
revolted against Justice. To maintain peace and tranquility in the city, Idrissa Bah was 
released and told to leave the prefecture permanently. 
In his letter translated into English, Idrissa Bah wrote: ‘’This letter is from your friends 
in Dinguiraye, to your respectful personalities. Since God sent His Messenger, our 
Prophet Mohammed, peace and blessings of Allah be upon Him, some people are above 
others. The promotion of ‘’Sunna’’ in the Guinean land. We of Dinguiraye, do not know 
the Sunna except the practice of Tidjane. The Sunna is the best of religions and not the 
Tidjane. We started teaching women, boys, as well as men until we got a lot of 
membership. We do not have a place to memorize the Holy Qu’ran. We have neither 
Madrassa (Qur’anic School) nor Sunna Mosque. Most of the people do not know what 
Sunna Islam is all about. That's why everywhere, where they find us teaching, they ask 
the owners or dealers to make us leave. This is why we inform your respectful 






personalities to help us achieve our goals. Obtaining a plot, a Qu’ranic school and a 
Sunna Mosque. If we get one of these three things, it would be better”. 
This case also shows how a Wahhabi trained scholar was trying to build his own 
Qu’ranic school and Mosque to preach the doctrine to people who reside in a region that 
is predominantly of Tidjane population. 
3.2. Mali 
Islam is practiced by the overwhelming majority of the Malian population. Most 
Malians are Sunni Muslims, with 9 percent of its population practicing indigenous faith 
and about 1 percent belong to the Christain faith.208 Although the 1992 Constitution 
enshrines the principle of secularism of the State, a legacy of colonization, all the 
interlocutors questioned point out from the outset central place of religion in the daily 
life of the Malians. Religious activities are present at all stages of life (baptisms, 
marriages, funerals), much more than the state representatives. The religious factor must 
be taken into account at the height of its importance in society. This is all the more true 
as the political class and the state are weakened and challenged, especially since the 
2012 crisis, when rebels from the north and groups claiming jihad have risen against the 
Malian state. The socioeconomic, political, moral and security bankruptcy of the 
postcolonial state gives religious a considerable weight in the public and political 
sphere. 
Mali, which is a neighbouring country to Guinea has also experienced several conflicts 
between the Wahhabists and the Traditionalist pertaining to issues of madrassas, which 
were firstly financed by traders, but later financed by the Arab-aid donors since the oil 
boom of the 1970s.209 For instance, in Bamako, the late 1950s were marked by violent 
conflict. In 1957, anti-Wahhabi riots (in Bambara Wahhabiyya-kele)210 broke out. There 
were many wounded, and the madrassas, particularly were targeted. But the support of 
the Muslim Cultural Union ( UCM), which brought together most of the Wahhabiya of 
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209 This case was taken from: Ferdaous Hardy, ‘’Les Medersas du Mali: Reforme, Insertion et 
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Bamako financially supported by traders, as well as the arrival in 1958 of Cheikhna 
Ahmed Yatabaré of Côte d'Ivoire, gave some resurgence to the movement of madrassas. 
These multiplied and the access of Mali to its independence contributed to their 
development.211 
The construction of this national Muslim identity was all the more assertive as it was 
part of a context of strengthening diplomatic ties with the Arab countries and benefited 
from the increase in oil revenues - and especially after the first shock of 1973, following 
which significant public and private aid with regards to Afro-Arab diplomatic relations, 
and loans from Islamic financing organizations arrived in Mali.212 
But the influx of these funds does not explain everything, and the expansion of the 
madrassas, which attract more and more students, is also linked to the crisis of state 
education just like I explained in our second case study pertaining to Guinea. The 
madrassas are more and more frequented and their number is multiplying all the more as 
they find the support of the populations.  In 1981, the madrassas received 36.62% of the 
children.213 They organize the teaching in a completely autonomous way and benefit 
from foreign establishments with which their directors negotiated with directly. The so-
called “promoters of madrassas’’ then use their many contacts in the countries where 
they studied Islamic language and religion, especially in the Gulf countries which 
concentrate a large part of its funding of their institutions. This autonomy was shaken in 
1985, when the madrassas passed under the supervision of the Ministry of Education 
(Quranic schools are still under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior). These 
measures give rise to a real counter offensive of the madrassas directors: carried by 
what has been called as “madrassah consciousness”, this counter-offensive is defended 
by the main actors of the Malian Association for the Unity and the progress of Islam 
(AMUPI) which was born in 1980.214 
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Relations between Ansar Dine215 which is considered by some locals as a Wahhabi 
group and the Wahhabi community are unpredictable. Mali is a secular state and 
according to the Ansar Dine’s leader, secularism is a disbelief.216 The region of Gao was 
very destabilized by the return, forty years ago, of citizens converted to Wahhabism in 
the 1960s and 1970s, wahhabist ideas began to circulate from the 1920s by the local 
Muslim traders Returning from the hajj to Mecca. Wahhabist reformers came into 
conflict both with indigenous purveyors of Islam, known as the Marabouts, and with the 
French colonial administrators.217 Most of them left the countryside to study Quranic 
studies in Niger and Nigeria. Some had been able to reach Sudan and Saudi Arabia, the 
cradle of Wahhabism. They began to convert families and notables to their vision of 
religion, and then to recruit new disciples by playing on family relationships. Although, 
after the withdrawal of thee French colonial administration in 1960s, Mali was 
characterised by religious tolerance, with extremist or fundamentalist of Islam finding 
little popular support 218. In the 1950s and 1960s, schools with curricula based on 
fundamentalist ideas, were created and founded by members of the Salafiyya in Guinea, 
Chad and Senegal before spreading to Mali and other West African Countries219. 
Finally, Wahhabi community forces moved to the cities, where trade with the Near East 
has enriched a large number of traders who invest in the madrassas and the media to 
accentuate their political influence. In August 2009, the opposition to the reform of the 
Code of persons and the family was led by Imam Mahmoud Dicko with protests 
involving tens of thousands of demonstrators in Bamako and Gao. Women were seen 
dressed in black from head to ankles. This mobilization had forced the Malian president 
to clear the law of all significant advances for women.220 
                                                          
215 Ansar Dineis a militant Islamist group led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the most prominent leaders of the 
Tuareg Rebellion.   Ansar Dine has its main base among the Ifora tribe from the southern part of the 
Tuaregs' homeland. See Gurfinkiel, Michel. ‘’Meet Azawad, Africa's Newest Country,’’ PJ Media, April 12, 
2012 
216 Haynes, J, Islam, State and Regime in Mali, (London Metropolitan University, 2017), 2. 
217 Haynes, Islam, State and Regime in Mali, 3 
218 Haynes, J. Religion and Politics in Africa, (London/Nairobi: Zed Books/East African Educational 
Publishers Ltd, 1996). 
219 Coulon, C. Les Musulmans et le Pouvoir en Afrique Noire, (Paris: Karthala, 1983), 153-54. 





3.2.1. Case 1: The Wahhabism Invasion and The Banconi Yard 
A publication221 made by JeuneAfrique, an online news channel on the 23rd of 
December, 2013 gave the following study about an association founded by the most 
famous Imam of Mali. The Imam clearly stated his resentment for Wahhabism mainly 
due to the Islamic reforms and division that has been going on in Mali for a long period 
of time. 
In Bamako, this place is called  “the Banconi yard”, the name of the popular 
neighborhood that grew up in the suburbs in the 1970s222. There is a school, a health 
center, an ultramodern mosque, a four storey building whose entrance is protected by 
guards and a security gantry, and finally the headquarters of Ançar Dine (which has 
nothing to do with Ansar Dine, the organization of Iyad Ag Ghaly), this association is 
founded by the master of the place, Chérif Ousmane Madani Haïdara, the most famous 
Imam of Mali. 
Haidara, which some call the Malian Mourid and which its followers call Nyemogo (the 
Guide), is considered the main Islamic alternative to Wahhabism and the historical 
enemy of the Sunni Reformed (the other name given to the Wahhabis and Salafists), 
according to Gilles Holder (2012)223, researcher at the Center for African Studies 
(CEAF). 
In Mali, as in the whole sub-region, the advance of a rigorous Islam coming from the 
Arabian Peninsula or Egypt and which wants to see only heresy in brotherhoods and 
ancestral marabout practices seems irreversible. 
According to Holder, Haidara himself is a reformist, but he remains faithful to 
Malisekism and claims Islam integrated into West African culture. It is besides in 
Bambara language that he preaches every year in the stadium of Modibo-Keita, in front 
of tens of thousands of followers. ‘’We are for Sufism, for a tolerant Islam’’, he says, 
“we are against Wahhabism” 
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The man is simple, without a tongue of wood. He accuses those who defend Wahhabism 
in Bamako of having links with armed Islamist groups raging in northern Mali, 
advocating violence and wanting to impose Sharia law. He argues that the Wahhabis 
represent only 10% of Malian Muslims, a figure impossible to verify,  but he must have 
admitted that they are more and more numerous. 
The implantation of this Islam come from elsewhere, is not recent. It began in the mid-
twentieth century with Dioulas traders making the round trip between West Africa and 
the Gulf, and with the return of the first students from Cairo's Al-Azhar University. 
The movement intensified in the 1970s and 1980s when, under the guise of 
humanitarian aid, Saudi Arabia set up (in northern Mali in particular) NGOs, health 
centers and schools promoting Wahhabism. The proponents of this doctrine also 
benefited, according to Holder, from the incessant competitions which then undermined 
the Maliki movements. 
‘’We live a sort of Arabization, confirms the anthropologist Moussa Sow (1992). When 
I was little, no one crossed his arms in the mosque. Today, this is done almost 
everywhere’’. And then, at the time, the Friday prayer was important, but nothing more, 
now it's sacred. He added that in 1960 there were about forty mosques in Bamako, 
against nearly a thousand today. 
Great preachers appeared, like Dicko and Haidara, who took advantage of the vacuum 
left by the state in matters of health and education, but also of social subjects, to gain 
legitimacy. And at this little game the most radical speeches are often the most audible, 
especially in urban areas. “We are no longer in quiet Islam”, says Sow, “we are moving 
towards Islamic-nationalism”. 
The case also support one of our motives behind the Arab-aid, which says that the Arab-
aid donors often embark on acquiring softpower, especially for promoting some 
doctrines, this is especially true for Saudi Arabia. Imam Haidara, in his statement 
clearly noted that due to Arab humanitarian aid and assistance, new groups have been 




3.2.2. Case 2: The Attack of the Malian Hotel 
This case study will start by analyzing the issue of the attack of a Hotel in Mali few 
years ago by a suspected Mosque224. This case continues, by giving information on what 
the Imams of various Mosques thinks about the society and what they have been 
preaching to the public, which are mainly negative comments.  
Wahhabi Islam is gaining ground in Mali. Mosques with fundamentalist imams, women 
veiled in black or in niqab are the most visible signs. But Islamists, who more and more 
openly claim the application of sharia law in a traditionally secular country, are also 
sometimes ready to come to blows. Monday, September 26, exactly at 4am, a group of 
people screaming “Allah akbar, astakfir” burst into the little nightclub of Hotel 
Flamboyant, in the district of Kalaban Coura, in Bamako. They burn the bar and 
disappear as they arrived. 
The act is isolated, but not insignificant. For several years, regularly, more or less 
violent incidents involving Islamists enamant the nightlife of the Malian capital. A 
tension around bars and meeting places that is inseparable from the rise of supporters of 
a type of hard Islam in Mali. But also the ambiguity of the Malian authorities, who fear 
the mobilization of Islamists against the government, as was the case in 2009 against the 
reform of the Family Code, which still awaits a second reading in the National 
Assembly. 
“When I started having problems with the followers of the Sabilou Rachad Mosque, the 
Malian Hotel Association told me to raise the wall of the terrace to hide what is 
happening inside, which I did. Shortly after, I had to change the entrance to the 
nightclub. But despite that, they came to break everything” says Mr. Dembélé, the 
owner of the hotel. 
In the new neighborhoods of Bamako more and more Mosques are built which are 
called “Wahhabis” by the population. People call us that, because we cross our arms 
praying, we do not do “fatiha” says Ibrahim Maiga, a Deputy Imam of the Grand 
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Mosque of the district of Magnambougou. He was educated in Saudi Arabia for 4 years 
he said, the Gulf countries sometimes finance studies, pilgrimages, equipment such as 
carpets of the mosque. But often, the religious building itself are supported by an NGO 
called Alpharouk, which finds help from outside countries, said Mohamed Fofana, 
deputy muezzin of the mosque Diamiou Ali Ibn Abitaleb, in the district of Lafiabougou. 
At the headquarters of the NGO, Hamdalaye ACI,  there is a Wahhabi mosque called 
Al-Muntada al-Islami, known for its ultra-conservative character. “Whoever is not a 
Muslim is not my brother, even if we are blood brothers” says the imam, Ousmane 
Traore. 
Back to Kalaban Coura, where the flamboyant nightclub was vandalized, Wahhabi 
Mosques are growing in large numbers here, said Sheik Ali Fofana, a teacher in a 
Madrassa located in the courtyard of the Sabilou Rachad Mosque, whose followers are 
believed to be behind the 26 September attack. . Every year, we welcome an average of 
80 new students in the autumn he said. 
In other neighborhood, such as one located in Yirimadjo, the “Daoud Mosque” is 
considered to be close to Pakistan. Barely 30 years old, the imam is Mohamed Togola 
but calls himself Mohamed Ben Mokhtar. We do not define ourselves as Wahhabis, he 
explains, but rather as Sunnis, a strict trend, of course, he added. There are no bars or 
clubs around, but if ever these things come here, we will not accept them, threatens Ben 
Mokhtar. 
Even the traditional Malian places, where girls and boys meet, is under threat. We will 
organize with other young Mosques to prevent this kind of demonstrations in our 
streets, says the deputy muezzin of the mosque of Lafiabougou. After a meeting on the 
subject at the Great Mosque of Bamako, on October 2, 2011, the League of Imams and 
Scholars for Islamic Solidarity issued a press release calling for tolerance and peace. 
3.3. Senegal 
At the dawn of African independence, Senegal had 94% of Muslims population, though 
the first president elected to the highest office was a Christain named Leopold Sedar 
Senghor, a sign of great political maturity and spirit of tolerance. And all the presidents 




General at least once during their terms.225 Sixty years later, under the guise of religion, 
the country became a missionary land for rigorous Islamists from Egypt and the Arabian 
Peninsula. The Muslim Brotherhood and the various Wahhabi re-Islamization 
movements are now expanding their tentacles to the chagrin of tolerant Islam.226 
To cope with this wave from afar, brotherhoods (Sufist) are tempted by radicalization 
for fear of being swept away. Brotherhood Islam is no longer safe from certain drifts. 
Thus, the Mourides, the most powerful of the brotherhoods of Senegal, constituted a 
real state in the state of Touba, their holy city which counts nearly a million inhabitants. 
The brotherhood (Murids) represent more than one third of the Senegalese 
population.227 
In this radiant city, cinemas are forbidden, as well as non-religious music. The schools 
of the Republic of this officially secular country are also forbidden. 
While Senegal has long enjoyed a peaceful image, the country is not spared by the rise 
of a rigorous Islam. The fight against terrorism remains one of Senegal's priorities, 
according to the Senegalese President Macky Sall on the sidelines of the Elysee Summit 
for Peace and Security in Africa on 7 December. In the aftermath of Operation Serval, 
he welcomed a great synergy with France and announced that the number of Senegalese 
soldiers present in Mali in the African Mission of Support in Mali had passed from 700 
to 815, in order to pursue a stabilization mission for the whole sub-region. 
In May 2013, a report by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
noted that Senegal is not totally immune to the spread of the jihadist threat, if only 
ideologically. A researcher at the Center for the Study of Religions at the University of 
Saint-Louis in Senegal, Bakary Sambe, one of the authors of the report, added that it is 
time to break the taboos, the big brotherhood themselves make protest within them. The 
authority in the brotherhoods is more and more fragmented and it is even disputed by 
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peripheral movements, small groups in which young people are engaged under the 
influence of charismatic leaders and against a background of social frustrations.228 
The investigation into the death of the four French tourists on 24 December 2007 in 
Aleg (southern Mauritania, 250 km east of Nouakchott) revealed that the killers 
benefited from several reception facilities and supplies during their crossing of Senegal 
and Gambia, before reaching Guinea-Bissau where they were arrested. On May 29, 
2010, three jihadists were arrested at Dakar airport by the Criminal Investigation 
Division (DIC). In February 2011, two alleged members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) were arrested in the suburbs of Dakar. Finally, in July 2012, the arrest 
in Dagana, northern Senegal, of ten people suspected of belonging to a terrorist 
network.229  
The Islamization of Senegalese society in the contemporary era has been further favored 
by the deployment of Islamic banks in a society in the process of growing 
impoverishment as a result of both drought and big scandals of corruption. Qatar, an 
alternative godfather to the Muslim Brotherhood, has been a powerful vehicle for the 
brotherhood's deployment, including through Islamic finance and its flagship channel 
Al-Jazeera, one of its instruments of economic and ideological penetration.   
3.3.1. Case 1: The Maurid Brotherhoods and The Wahhabists 
This case discusses the annoyance of Maurid brotherhoods in Touba region of Senegal 
who attacked the residents of two Imams that have been preaching the Wahhabi 
doctrine of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Let's first analyze the older case of Imam Abdou Karim Ndour, that made headlines in 
2011230. This imam, in his forties, had his first years of study at the Keur-Gou-Mag 
neighborhood in Diourbel before flying off after a few adventures for Saudi Arabia to 
pursue his studies in the faculty of Sharia at the University of Medina. He had almost 
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seen his house burnt down as a result of repeated preaching that was hurting the faith of 
the local Mouride disciples. Following messages of appeasement from Mouride 
religious guides like Serigne Mountakha Mbacké, returned quickly and the preacher 
himself decided to withdraw the complaint he had lodged. 
The recent case of Amsatou Gaye is similar to the one discussed above except that the 
stage of the fire or physical violence was not reached and he decided, as reported by the 
press articles of the time, he was asked to pack up and leave the city in a discreet way 
before the decision of final expulsion was pronounced against him. The teacher-
preacher also made a statement in a community radio where he exposes his career, his 
commitment, his activities in the city and the circumstances that led him to this situation 
of conflict with the authorities of Touba. He mentioned, among other things, to defend 
himself against the settling of accounts of his family members who wanted to put him in 
harm's way with the authorities of the city.  
It is important to note by examining these two cases and the treatment that had been 
reserved for them by the press, that the image that has remained in the public opinion is 
no longer that of the preacher who runs up against the sensibility of a part of the 
population that is entitled, after all, to respect for its religious convictions. Opinion 
seems to have retained the image of men persecuted for their ideas by a horde of 
barbarians who would not accept a questioning of the teachings of their religious guide 
or their doctrine in a general way.  
3.3.2. Case 2: The Timbuktu Institute Research 
This case231 study was done in 2016 by the Timbuktu Institute on the perception of 
terrorism among young people in the Suburbs of Dakar. The research was done by Dr. 
Bakary Sambe232. 
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The investigators went to meet 400 young people between the ages of 18 and 35, 
interviewed in Dakar suburbs such as Parcelles Assainies, Pikine and Guédiawaye. 
They presented them with a questionnaire containing about forty points, including 
sensitive questions about the brotherhoods, the vision of Islam, the income-generating 
activity of the people surveyed, the person who, in the perception of young people, 
would know the Quran better and about the actual or supposed representation of Islam 
by the brotherhoods. 
Several answers allowed first of all to establish a typical profile of respondents. These 
young people in the suburbs of Dakar are mostly single and more than a third have no 
income-generating activity, although more than 90% of them have been educated. A 
youth that considers mainly the state as failing in its fight against terrorism. A revealing 
profile when it is put in perspective with the answers given: almost half of the young 
people interviewed rightly felt that it is poverty and unemployment that make the bed of 
terrorism. 
First conclusion of the survey showed that the majority of interviewees are suspicious of 
various forms of radicalization. For example, to the question “what do you do if you 
witness a virulent preach?” A third of the youth surveyed said they would no longer 
attend the mosque in question, and 20 percent said they would warn the authorities. 
According to the report, the major religious brotherhoods are always listened to by the 
youth despite the rise of so-called reformist movements and despite a negative 
perception of brotherhoods among some young people interviewed. Above all, 90.3% of 
the respondents said they did not intend to join a group that defends a so-called radical 
Islam. 
The Timbuktu Institute team then turned their attention to the less than 10% of the 
young people surveyed who explained to the investigators that they were ready to join a 
radical group. For them, the first reason given is the defense of Islam with a score of 
(48%). Moreover, they said they were satisfied or showed no reaction to the most 
publicized terrorist actions such as the attacks in Paris and expressed their disagreement 
with the foreign military presence, especially French army, which, according to them 




Their responses on socio-economic topics have also shown that in the sample, there is 
an amount of young people ready to join a radical group, the rejection of the official 
education system, and a feeling of marginalization. 
We can see in this case study that about 10% of the youths being interviewed were 
willing to join any form of radical groups, the defense of Islam was half of their reasons 
why they would join such groups, but the study also showed that poor living condition 
is also a potential factors. 
3.4. Iranıan Factor 
The tables233 and graph below provide data and information on Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf oil producing countries that gave out more financial aid and assistance to the world 
immediately after the Iranian Revolution. Arab counries, Saudi Arabia particularly, has 
been a main rival of Iran in the spread of religious ideologies around the world. One of 
the ways Saudi Arabia do this is by giving out aid to poor regions to convince their 
government to have the same standing with them in any global decision making.234 
There was also a cessation of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the late 
1980s.235 The American scholar Joseph Nye is credited with being the first person to 
coin the term “soft power.” The soft power of a country is based on three resources: the 
culture, the value of internal policy, and the strength of the foreign policy236. 
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Grant commitment of Saudi Arabia from 1980-1994 (US Dollars, Millions) 
















Data Source: The World Bank 
Although this data does not provide information for Saudi Arabia’s total grant 
commitment before the Iranian Revolution, but it clearly shows that the country started 
making its grant commitment public immediately after the revolution and a dramatic 
increase can be seen in the year 1984. 
Saudi Arabia’s concerns about increased Iranian influence have prompted it to push 
back, particularly after the ascension of King Salman. Saudi Arabia poured investments 
into the public and private sectors in West Africa and the Sahel. But Saudi penetration 
also extended into the religious realm, with a focus on the Maliki Muslims who 
compose the majority of West African population237 
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Loan Commitment of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from 1980-1990 (US Dollars, 
Millions) 
Year Amount 
 Saudi Arabia Kuwait 
1980 2,994.54 1,182.55 
1981 3,174.60 890.67 
1982 1,128.05 915.65 
1983 1,062.53 415.96 
1984 576.73 266.93 
1985 480.68 204.53 
1986 325.46 299.33 
1987 421.21 260.30 
1988 148.53 274.99 
1989 182.41 335.17 
1990 191.62 741.03 
Data Source: The World Bank 
This table also does not Show the loan commitment made by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
before the Iranian Revolution. The loan commitment also came to the public scene after 
the revolution in 1979. It is noticeable in the table that Kuwait gave out its highest loan 
commitment in 1980, a year after the Iranian Revolution. The loan commitment was 
also high for Saudi Arabia in both 1980 and 1981, but it started decreasing drastically 
after 1981. This also testifies that Saudi Arabia loan commitment was high in the 






Total Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Commitments from 1989 to 1990 (US Dollars, 
Millions) 
Year Amount 
 Saudi Arabia Kuwait 
1989 5,149.36 1,976.37 
1981 5,575.54 1,830.09 
1982 3,362.66 1,755.25 
1983 3,440.54 1,228.69 
1984 3,747.70 747.18 
1985 2,724.35 608.18 
1986 3,919.50 1,069.14 
1987 3,173.51 401.95 
1988 2,139.20 374.95 
1989 1,391.27 519.24 
1990 4,575.20 2,129.81 
Data Source: The World Bank 
This table shows the total commitment both grant and loan made by Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait after the Iranian Revolution. Although, Kuwait made its highest grant 
commitment in 1990, but there was also an increase in commitment following the 
period after the revolution compared to other years. Saudi Arabia also made its highest 






Total Gross Disburstment of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from 1977 to 1986 (US 
Dollars, Millions) 
Year Amount 
 Saudi Arabia Kuwait 
1977 2,281.91 763.13 
1978 5,081.04 823.91 
1979 3,874.35 922.69 
1980 5,592.67 1066.15 
1981 5,423.85 1166.07 
1982 3,612.52 1061.26 
1983 3,110.79 929.97 
1984 3,183.93 999.55 
1985 2,608.24 803.74 
1986 3,631.47 775.53 
Data Source: The World Bank 
The table above shows the gross disburstment of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from 
the year 1977-1986. The gross disburstment for the two countries started increasing 
dramatically immediately after the revolution compared to the preceding years. Saudi 
Arabia also made a high gross disburstment a year before the Iranian Revolution, but a 
stable growth was maintained after the revolution.  
The graph below shows a better presentation of the table above for the gross 






Graph 1: Graphical Presentation of the Gross Disburstment from 1977 to 1986 
From the tables and graph above, it is proven that Arab aid to SSA countries increased 
or came to Public awareness after the Iranian Revolution. This support the arguments 
behind one of the motives that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf oil producing 
countries give financial aid to SSA countries to decrease the influence of Iranian Shiism 
in this region.  
One of the missions of the Iranian Islamic government was to share its ideology to other 
part of the world after the Revolution. In order to make this possible, the Iranian 
government gave out scholarship to other poorer regions to study in Iran. Some of this 
student that graduated, returned back to their home country to preach Shiism.  
In order for this Iranian mission to stop, that is, in order for the Iranian ideology not to 
spread worldwide, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries started giving out more 
financial aid, grants and loans to Africa. Most of the Arab countries were more involved 
in doing charitable activities in SSA countries. This charitable activity included building 
of mosques, social facilities for health and education. Saudi Arabia was more involved 
in giving out scholarship to students in SSA countries for Islamic studies and theology. 
Saudi Arabia also sponsored the building of mosques in this region, the students that 
returned to their home country became leaders and Imams in these mosques and they 














CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The African continent is once again confronted with a major problem, that of the 
expansion of jihadism on its territory. Africa is in an era of Islamic radicalization which 
is getting more and more severe. While we sometimes forget that religion is not 
necessarily political, more and more armed groups are demanding the establishment of 
governments subject to Islamist religious doctrines. Since 2010, the political and 
Islamist activities have been extremely turbulent in several African regions. From the 
religious persecution of the Boko Haram armed group to the Salafist and Maliki Islam 
opposition in West Africa, several conflicts have erupted over the past seven years. 
I discussed several determinants and motives of the Arab aid to SSA countries. This 
determinants and motives include Arab Countries, Afro-Arab Solidarity, Islamic 
Countries, Same Voting Pattern and Diplomatic Relations with Israel. As discussed in 
the thesis, Same Voting Pattern and Diplomatic Relations with Israel are all political 
factors the Arab aid donors embark on before giving out humanitarian assistance and 
loans. However, Arab Countries as a determinant and motive does not have much to do 
with SSA. The only Arab country in SSA is Sudan, which was not discussed in this 
thesis. Islamic Countries as a determinant is also very important, the three countries in 
our case study are all Islamic countries by population and they have so far being the 
largest receiver of the Arab humanitarian aid.  
A model was also provided in this thesis to explain how Arab humanitarian activities, 
such as Saudi Arabia has influenced the lives of people. The model argued that 
humanitarian and charitable activities come in 3 different ways 1. Islamic Schools 2. 
Mosques and 3. Scholarship. These 3 activities mentioned above have all contributed to 
the radicalization of the youths. This radicalization coupled with illiteracy, lack of 
security, porosity of borders, corruption and mismanagement of public fund can 
encourage unemployed and hopeless youth to participate in various types of violence 
and terrorism. 
In the final part of this thesis, 4 tables and a graph was presented to see how Arab aid 




was to counter the influence of Iran in the Islamic world and also to gain soft power in 
the Islamic world.  
By succeeding in disturbing the Senegalese religion and implanting a radical Islamism 
within the institutions of the country, the jihadist groups would obtain a symbolic 
victory. In this regard, Sfeir compares Senegal to a religious showcase and says that if 
indeed extremist Islam can be established in Senegal, the rest of West Africa will 
certainly become a radical stronghold. In fact, according to the political scientist, the 
greatest danger behind this radicalization is that: If secularism falls, all other countries 
will become porous automatically, and a chain reaction can ensue. 
This is not unlike the case of Mali, neighboring country of Senegal, which was a real 
gateway to radical Islamists. This West African country had rubbed shoulders with 
radical Islamism, whereas at the beginning of 2010, a branch of al-Qaeda (AQIM) had 
spread on its territory. This group, mainly financed by Qatar, tried to enter Senegal 
directly, but without success. In the end, more fear than harm, but the threat is still real. 
Islamic radicalism also draws strength from the challenge of traditional Senegalese 
Islam. Thus, Salafist and Wahhabi ideologies would like to rebel against the 
brotherhood Islam implanted in Senegal, whereas they would deem it impure and that 
sharia should be implanted in political affairs. 
Without real impacts being felt in response to this phenomenon of radicalization, the 
Senegalese government remains on guard and ready to counter the threat. In January 
2015, President Macky Sall also convened his security council to deal with the issue of 
terrorism and jihadist threats. New border crossings were created at the border between 
Senegal and Mauritania to counter ISIL contamination  
The biggest threat to date in Senegal is called Boko Haram. In December 2015, the 
arrest of a group of Senegalese jihadist militants was reported. The latter would have 
tried to create in their country a branch of Boko Haram and have even developed a plan 
for an attack in the capital. 
Despite a weak presence of religious extremism, we can question the scope of such 
radicalization. This is what the Timbuktu institute (Observatory of Radicalisms and 




Observatory has been interested in Senegalese youth, in order to know their perception 
of terrorism and radical groups. Thus, the studies pursued by the researcher Bakary 
Sambe tried to determine how young Senegalese could be seduced by jihadist ideology. 
This research was clearly examined in our case study relating to Senegal. 
Senegalese Islam remains to this day the greatest protection against waves of extremists. 
Practiced for over a hundred years, brotherhood Islam questions itself and opposes any 
form of radicalization. It is therefore essential to differentiate radical Islam from Islam 
when trying to understand the state of Senegalese religion. The institutionalization of 
this brotherhood religion is the biggest bulwark against jihadist movements. According 
to Sfeir, the brotherhoods offer a much more open reading of the Qur'an than Islamists 
and Salafists can do. 
In summary, since the threat is still real, Senegal will have to take certain precautions 
similar to those put forward by President Sall. The country will have to fight corruption, 
but also the wealth gap, in order to avoid any governmental intervention of the more 
radical movements. The team at the Timbuktu observatory also proposes some solutions 
to prevent young people from joining radical groups. These requirements aim in 
particular to bring down the unemployment rate among 18 to 35 year olds, but also to 
submit a more egalitarian model of society. 
Only the future can tell us whether Senegal will retain its secular political values while 
respecting brotherhood Islam as the foundation of its religious culture. For the moment, 
the country is not the real prey of the extremist movements. 
On Wednesday, 26th of April, 2017, Bangladesh, an Asian country also approved the 
construction of 560 mosques on its soil which will be financed by Riyadh with costs 
amounting to nearly one billion euros. 
For over 50 years, this donation strategy for building religious buildings abroad has 
allowed the Gulf Kingdom to disseminate a sectarian doctrine around the world that 
fuels and inspires Sunni extremism. 
In this Asian country with a large Muslim majority, the project worries the defenders of 




mosques will become new mediums of diffusion of the very rigorous Islam preached by 
the petromony of the Gulf. 
Bangladesh is far from being the first country to benefit financial favors from Saudi 
Arabia for this type of project. For more than fifty years, Saudi Arabia has supported the 
construction of hundreds of mosques, schools or Islamist cultural centers around the 
world - from Brussels to Yvelines, from Kosovo to China, via the United Kingdom, 
United States, Afghanistan, and Africa - to spread Wahhabism, a sectarian doctrine that 
fuels Sunni extremism. Wahhabism which was founded around 1745 by Mohammed-
Abd el-Wahhab, spread outside Saudi Arabia, following the main trade routes of the 
time, especially in Africa. The dynamics intensified between the 1970s and the 1980s, 
when the petromarchy began to install - on the grounds of humanitarian aid - NGOs, or 
even schools spreading this ideology on several continents. According to the British 
historian Charles Allen, one of the few scholars to have studied the economic aspect of 
Saudi religious diplomacy, the Gulf monarchy has paid, since 1979, more than 70 
billion dollars (about 65 billion euros) to finance these projects abroad. 
War affected or poor areas are particularly suitable for the establishment of Wahhabism. 
In the aftermath of the war for the independence of Kosovo, for example, Saudi Arabia 
supported the construction of 240 mosques in the small Balkan Republic and 
established a scholarship system allowing Kosovo preachers to study abroad. This is 
also the case especially in Africa, students are given scholarship to study in Saudi 
Arabia. Returning to their country of origin, these Imams also transmit in the villages 
the rigorous version of the Koran that was taught to them. According to some figures 
about 30,000 people have been trained in these Saudi Islamic universities, most of this 
preachers can be found throughout the Sahelian belt, in Mali, in Niger, in the Central 
African Republic etc. explained in an interview with the Point in September by former 
high-ranking defense official Pierre Conesa who explained that the Saudis spend 7 to 8 
billion dollars for their religious diplomacy every year. 
As a policy recommendation, it will be very beneficial if the Arab aid donors clearly 
clarify their motives of giving out loans and humanitarian assistance. These loans both 
bilateral and multilateral should be well documented and the bilateral and multilateral 




enable the SSA receiving authorities and institutions to use the aid in an effective way, 
this will also decrease the rate of corruption associated with aid giving. Finally the SSA 
governments and authorities should also separate the state from religious institutions, 
the state should be in charge of the institution and if possible the Sermons and activities 
of every Mosque should be well controlled and they should be a particular form or sect 
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